A Vulnerability Assessment of the East Tennessee State University Administrative Computer Network. by Ashe, James Patrick
East Tennessee State University
Digital Commons @ East
Tennessee State University
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Student Works
5-2004
A Vulnerability Assessment of the East Tennessee
State University Administrative Computer
Network.
James Patrick Ashe
East Tennessee State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.etsu.edu/etd
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works at Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State
University. For more information, please contact digilib@etsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ashe, James Patrick, "A Vulnerability Assessment of the East Tennessee State University Administrative Computer Network." (2004).
Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 858. https://dc.etsu.edu/etd/858
 
 
A Vulnerability Assessment of the East Tennessee State University Administrative 
Computer Network 
 
_______________________________ 
 
A thesis 
presented to 
the faculty of the Department of Computer and Information Sciences 
East Tennessee State University 
 
In partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree 
Master of Science in Computer Science 
 
_______________________________ 
 
by 
James P. Ashe 
May 2004 
 
_______________________________ 
 
Dr. Phillip E. Pfeiffer, IV, chair 
Dr. Gene Bailey 
Dr. Qing Yuan 
 
Keywords: network security, system security, security audit, nmap, nessus 
 Abstract 
 
A Vulnerability Assessment of the East Tennessee State University Administrative 
Computer Network 
 
by 
 
James P. Ashe 
 
A three phase audit of East Tennessee State University’s administrative computer 
network was conducted during Fall 2001, Spring 2002, and January 2004.  Nmap 
and Nessus were used to collect the vulnerability data.  Analysis discovered an 
average of 3.065 critical vulnerabilities per host with a low of 2.377 in Spring 2001 
to a high of 3.694 in Fall 2001.  The number of unpatched Windows operating 
system vulnerabilities, which accounted for over 75% of these critical 
vulnerabilities, strongly argues for the need of an automated patch deployment 
system for the approximately 3,000 Windows-based systems at ETSU.  
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 Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The security of a university’s computing network is important to that 
university’s faculty, staff and students.  A university’s educational processes are 
hindered and its students, and faculty and staff are inconvenienced when 
network services or system services become unavailable.  In addition, when 
networked records are not secured, sensitive information such as personal 
student information can be retrieved and made public. 
Network security refers to the application of systems security to a 
connected network of systems.  System security is the incorporation of standard 
security measures into computing.  Security is defined as measures adopted by 
organizations to prevent espionage, sabotage, attack or other crime 
[AmHeritage]. According to Farmer and Spafford, 
 
To make a system secure means to protect the information from 
disclosure; protecting it from alteration; preventing others from 
denying access to the machine, its services and its data; preventing 
degradation of services that are present; protecting against 
unauthorized changes; and protecting against unauthorized 
access [Farmer1]. 
 
Attacks upon network security include non-technological threats like 
unwarranted physical proximity and sabotage, and technological threats like 
Internet worms, hacking, computer viruses, wiretapping, and espionage.  
Technological threats can be further categorized as direct network-based 
attacks or automated attacks.  Direct network-based attacks include attempts 
to learn information about a network or gather information stored in a 
networked system.  Automated attacks include programs or scripts that, once 
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 released into a networked environment, attack vulnerable systems in that 
environment. 
This thesis is concerned with the use of security audits to assess the 
vulnerability of university computer systems and networks.  A security audit 
examines systems on a local area network to detect “holes” that may be 
exploited by malicious people.  Such holes include physical intrusion, abuse of 
privilege by legitimate users, and software vulnerabilities.   
This work took the form of an investigation of the security of the East 
Tennessee State University administrative computer network.  Motivated by a 
major system compromise, a previous study of the ETSU administrative network 
activity sought to determine the types, severity, and number of potential attacks 
an academic network would experience over a period of time [Cui].  Over a six 
month period between October 2000 and March 2001, a large percentage of 
the total incoming network traffic was captured and further analyzed.  This 
research recorded a range of two-hundred thousand to two million attack 
packets per day, involving port scans, denial of service attacks, and various 
attempts to exploit known system vulnerabilities.  Cui’s research raised the 
question that this research attempted to address: ‘If the ETSU network 
environment is not protected, and attacks happen daily, what is the state of 
ETSU security?’ 
 This research sought to determine the susceptibility of the ETSU 
administrative computer network to attack.  East Tennessee State University, a 
moderate size regional university with approximately 11,250 students and 3,000 
staff and faculty, controls a single class B Internet address space 
(151.141.0.0/16).  Approximately 3,600 Internet addresses on this network are in 
active use.   
ETSU has two distinct computer networks.  One network, which is excluded 
from this study, connects student dormitories with one another and the Internet. 
Computers on this network, which receive private internet addresses in the 
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 192.168.x.y range, are only directly reachable by other ETSU student network 
systems, and therefore not vulnerable to attacks originating from the ETSU 
administrative network or the Internet.  The other network, the administrative 
network, connects all administrative buildings, computer labs and classrooms 
with one another and the Internet.  Systems on the ETSU administrative network 
are assigned a 151.141.x.y Internet address and are directly accessible by any 
computer on the Internet. 
The audit was carried out in three phases during the Fall 2001, Spring 2002 
and Spring 2004 semesters.  A full network audit was conducted during the initial 
two phases using the Nmap and Nessus security auditing tools.  The third phase 
was a partial network scan in Spring 2004 to gauge the degree to which earlier 
observations had changed. 
Each scan attempted to balance the need to gather data with the need 
to accommodate normal network operation.   Tests that would have involved 
attempted denial of service attacks were avoided.  Tests of systems that were 
known to have personal firewalls were skipped, to avoid alarming users. 
Scans were also done in a way that attempted to account for computer 
downtime.  Under ideal circumstances, all systems would have remained 
connected to the network at all times.  This was true of some computer systems, 
such as laboratory systems, network equipment and servers.  Most systems, such 
as administrative workstations, are suspected to be shut down on a nightly basis.  
Accordingly, rescans of unreachable hosts were used to increase the chance of 
compiling data on all networked hosts. 
The key findings of the study found an average host exhibited 3.065 
critical vulnerabilities, with a low of 2.377 in Spring 2001 to high a of 3.694 in Fall 
2001.  Unpatched Windows operating system vulnerabilities were the top 
security threat to the ETSU administrative network over this 2½ year span 
accounting for over 80% of all critical vulnerabilities.  However, an automated 
patch management system has yet to be implemented because of concerns 
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 expressed by the user community over operating system patches ‘breaking’ 
applications. 
 The remainder of this thesis is separated into four sections.  Section 2, 
Related Work, describes the background research performed for this study.  This 
section also describes the tools used in this study.  Section 3, Research 
Methodology, describes the motivation for this study, as well as the strategy 
used to perform the security audit.  Section 4, Data Analysis, examines the data 
gathered during the audit.  Section 5, Conclusion, includes a summary of the 
study’s findings and potential avenues for research. 
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 Chapter 2 
Related Work 
 
The current section reviews tools for detecting security vulnerabilities that 
are directly related to work in this study.  Section 2.1 discusses the two tools used 
in this study, Nmap (Section 2.1.2.1) and Nessus (Section 2.1.2.2). 
 The remainder of this discussion assumes a fair understanding of Windows 
and UNIX networking, the TCP and UDP protocols, network security and different 
activities normally placed under the ‘hacking’ umbrella. 
  
2.1.  Security Threats and Security Auditing Tools 
 
2.1.1.  Security Threats 
 
Security auditing tools were developed to help network and systems 
administrators gather information about vulnerabilities in their networked 
environment.  These vulnerabilities include unauthorized services, system 
configuration errors, well-known vulnerabilities and weak user passwords. 
 Identifying unauthorized services.  An unauthorized service is an 
unauthorized host program that listens for and accepts connections from other 
systems.  Legitimate services typically use well-known ports to accept 
connections.  For example, web servers listen on TCP port 80 and telnet hosts 
listen on TCP port 23.  A port that is in the ‘listening’ state is referred to as an 
open port.  Examples of unauthorized services include services running on non-
standard ports, services that respond to user requests in non-standard ways, and 
services that are unnecessary for the system being scanned.  These can be 
detected by scanning a host for all ports actively listening for connection 
requests and examining how they process incoming messages. 
11 
  Identifying system configuration errors.  A system configuration error is a 
misconfiguration of a service that leaves the service or system susceptible to 
attack.  Unset passwords and shared key files are examples of configuration 
errors.  Operating system installation procedures assign default permissions and 
passwords to certain files and accounts.  In certain cases, the system default 
creates system vulnerabilities.  For example, a UNIX password file readable by 
the ‘world’ group can be copied and deciphered, compromising the host 
system. 
 Identifying ‘well-known’ vulnerabilities.  Well-known system vulnerabilities 
are discovered software programming errors or common administrator 
oversights that allow a system or network to be compromised.  These include 
publicly documented instances of buffer overflows and backdoors in 
application and operating system software.  Finding and patching holes 
increases network security by minimizing the infiltration paths an attacker can 
use. 
 Identifying weak user passwords.  User passwords that are easy to guess or 
crack can allow outsiders to gain network access.  Strategies for decreasing the 
likelihood of compromised passwords include mandatory policies for password 
selection. 
 
2.1.2.  Security Auditing Tools 
 
Security auditing tools are utilities that detect vulnerabilities in systems that 
could be exploited to compromise a system.  The types of vulnerabilities 
detected vary with each tool.  LC4 (http:///www.atstake.com/lc4) is a tool 
created for the sole purpose of testing password strength.  Other tools like the IIS 
Lockdown Tool (http://www.microsoft.com/windowsserver2003/iis/default.mspx) 
test a service for configuration errors and make reparations where necessary.  
Tools such as Nessus (http://www.nessus.org) and the Microsoft Baseline Security 
12 
 Analyzer (http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tools/mbsahome.asp) 
check for exploits against a database of well-known attacks.   The port-scanning 
tool Nmap (http://www.insecure.org) aids in detecting unauthorized services.  
Using a combination of tools is the typical way to maximize the number of 
detected vulnerabilities in a networked environment. 
Nmap and Nessus were chosen for this study, in part, because these tools 
can work in conjunction to minimize audit time and maximize the number of 
discovered vulnerabilities.  Nessus uses a user-configurable database of tests to 
drive vulnerability analyses.  The Nessus database is updated frequently, 
sometimes daily, by the security community, in response to discoveries of new 
exploits.  Nessus can be configured to use Nmap to determine the open ports 
on a system before conducting tests, which allows Nessus to focus solely on 
potentially vulnerable ports.  Finally, both tools are free to use, and native to 
Linux, a free operating system. 
 
2.1.2.1.  Nmap 
 
Nmap is a network auditing tool that scans network hosts for open ports.  
Port scans can determine if a host is offering errant services or failing to offer 
required services.  Examples of errant services are an http daemon on a host not 
listed as a web server and a backdoor opened by a Trojan horse.  Nmap can 
also determine the operating system running on a scanned host, and scan 
firewalls to determine the ports a firewall effectively filters [Fyodor]. 
Nmap can scan network hosts using one of six methods: TCP connect() 
scans, TCP SYN scans, stealth FIN scans, Xmas tree scans, Null scans, UDP scans, 
and ping scans. 
 The TCP connect() scan, the simplest port scanning method, attempts to 
create a TCP connection between the scanning client and the host.  The 
auditor determines the TCP ports that Nmap will scan.  Nmap allows any user to 
13 
 execute a TCP connect() scan, regardless of privilege.  The TCP connect() scan 
is highly traceable by intrusion detection systems, and an unlikely choice of 
attackers [Fyodor]. 
 The TCP SYN scan mimics the TCP connect() scan but does not complete 
the TCP connection.  Nmap sends a SYN (synchronize) packet to the host and 
awaits a reply.  A RST (reset) packet from the host indicates there are no services 
available on the scanned TCP port.  An ACK (acknowledgement) packet 
indicates a service is available on the scanned TCP port.  When the host 
receives an ACK packet, Nmap sends a RST packet to destroy the pending 
connection.  Nmap limits the use of TCP SYN scans to root users, since standard 
TCP stacks do not track reset connections [Fyodor]. 
FIN scans, Xmas tree scans, and null scans use irregular TCP packets to 
discover open ports.  The TCP header contains a 6-bit control block with six flags: 
URG (urgent data), ACK (positive acknowledgement), PSH (push data to 
receiver), RST (reset connection), SYN (synchronize), and FIN (finish transfer) 
[RFC793].  The Stealth FIN scan sends a FIN packet to the host and awaits a 
reply.  A closed port that receives a FIN packet should reply with a RST packet as 
detailed in RFC 793, reset generation, rule 1: 
 
If the connection does not exist (CLOSED) then a reset is sent in 
response to any incoming segment except another reset.  In 
particular, SYNs addressed to a non-existent connection are 
rejected by this means [RFC793]. 
 
Ports that fail to reply with an RST packet are assumed to be open. 
 Xmas Tree scans and Null scans are variations of the Stealth FIN scan.  The 
Xmas Tree scan sets the FIN, URG and PSH flags.  The Null scan turns off all flags n 
the 6-bit control block.  Stealth FIN, Xmas Tree and Null scans do not work 
against some operating systems because of TCP protocol modifications.  In 
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 particular, the Microsoft Windows TCP protocol will not send an RST packet in 
response to these scans [Fyodor]. 
 Nmap detects open UDP ports by sending a zero-byte UDP packet to 
every host UDP port.  If the host replies the port is unreachable, the scanned port 
is closed.  No response from the host indicates the UDP port is open [Fyodor]. 
 Using a ping scan, Nmap can determine the existence of systems at 
specified IP addresses.  Nmap ping scans use standard ICMP echo packets and 
TCP ACK packets sent to port 80.  This feature of Nmap is most useful when 
sweeping a network segment to determine the number of hosts on a network 
segment.  The TCP ACK packet discovers hosts behind a firewall that filters 
standard ICMP echo packets.  TCP ACK packets will only be sent when a root 
user initiates a ping scan [Fyodor]. 
 
2.1.2.2.  Nessus 
 
Nessus is a UNIX-based security scanner that checks for well-known 
vulnerabilities on various platforms.  The specific vulnerabilities that Nessus 
checks are determined as part of an initial configuration step that involves 
choosing the plug-ins of the associated vulnerability that the user wishes to 
discover.   Tests for vulnerabilities can be created by anyone using the NASL 
scripting language.  The tool’s authors determine which plug-ins are distributed 
with the scanner for use by the Nessus community.  Active support from the 
open source community has ensured a constantly increasing supply of new, 
downloadable, vulnerability tests. 
 Nessus emulates the first well-known security scanner, the Security 
Administrator Tool for Analyzing Networks (SATAN) [Farmer3].  SATAN, like Nessus, 
attempts to break into a host to determine the level of host security.  Unlike 
Nessus, SATAN cannot detect recently discovered vulnerabilities, and was 
therefore rejected for this study.   
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  The Nessus program uses two different executables to scan hosts and 
collect data.  The ‘server,’ called the Nessus daemon (nessusd), is responsible for 
‘attacking’ each host.  The Nessus daemon must be executed on a UNIX-based 
machine.  The ‘client,’ called nessus, collects the data from the attack.  
Currently, the client portion of the Nessus program is available for UNIX and 
Windows [Deraison1]. 
 The server portion of Nessus supports various options for multiple situations.  
Nessus offers multi-user support and the ability to grant different rights to each 
user.  Multi-user support allows security administrators to grant rights to scan 
selected subsets of a network.  Nessus can also use multithreading to conduct 
concurrent audits.  The number of hosts that can effectively be audited 
simultaneously is determined by available network bandwidth and the 
processing speed of the Nessus daemon computer [Deraison1].  The Nessus 
client collects and arranges data received from the vulnerability assessment 
[Deraison2]. 
 Nessus offers the following twenty-three families of rule sets for use in a 
security audit [Deraison3].   
 
• Trojan backdoors.  Trojan backdoor servers are often distributed through 
e-mail as attachments.  The unsuspecting recipient executes the infected 
program expecting to view something interesting or amusing.  Instead, the 
attachment installs the Trojan backdoor program onto the system.  
Scanning well-known Trojan ports detects the presence of a Trojan 
backdoor.   
• CGI script vulnerabilities.  A CGI script is a server-side executable.  CGI 
scripts with programming errors are vulnerable to security flaws.  Searching 
the UNIX \cgi-bin directory detects possible flawed CGI scripts . 
• Cisco network device vulnerabilities.  Nessus, in most cases, uses SNMP to 
check the version of the system IOS and compare it to version numbers of 
16 
 the Cisco IOS with known vulnerabilities.   Use of these plug-ins requires 
knowledge of a Cisco device’s read-only SNMP community string.  This 
group of plug-ins was added to Nessus too late for inclusion in this study . 
• Default UNIX accounts.  This rule set tests certain well-known UNIX 
accounts for having a default password, or no password at all.  This group 
of plug-ins was added to Nessus too late for inclusion in this study. 
• Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.  This rule set checks for DoS susceptibility in 
applications, servers, switches and routers.  A denial of service (DoS) 
attack is launched by issuing commands that crash the target by means 
of ‘confusion’ or buffer overflow.  Nessus attempts to crash a host using a 
DoS attack to detect software and hardware vulnerabilities. 
• Finger daemon vulnerabilities.  The UNIX ‘finger’ command shows user 
information.  Depending on the daemon’s configuration, the user being 
‘fingered’ can belong to a local or remote network.  Finger daemons 
provide the names of active accounts, which is a security threat by itself.  
Some finger daemons have security flaws that offer private information 
about users, or allow attackers to gain system control. 
• Firewall configuration errors.  This rule set attempts to bypass the firewall 
and alerts administrators of subsequent firewall configuration errors.  
Malicious parties can ‘hop’ a poorly configured firewall to access network 
resources. 
• FTP vulnerabilities.  FTP (File Transfer Protocol) servers distribute files to users 
with proper credentials.  Some FTP servers exhibit flaws that allow 
attackers to retrieve arbitrary information or gain control of the system.  
Detection of FTP server vulnerabilities involves attempting well-known 
exploits. 
• UNIX shell exploits.  A UNIX shell accepts user commands for execution.  
Shell access is normally reserved for authorized system users.  Gaining shell 
access allows a user to execute hazardous commands, change a host’s 
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 configuration and access possibly sensitive data.  Not all possible 
commands and applications may be executed with just shell access, as 
root privileges may be necessary. 
• Remote UNIX root exploits.  This rule set tests whether outside parties can 
gain root access to a system, and with it, the ability to execute any 
command or application, or examine any data file on the exploited host. 
• General.  This rule set tests for programs and daemons that provide their 
name and version number.  Attackers can use this information to 
determine if a host might exhibit well-known vulnerabilities.  Nessus 
attempts to gather operating system and version information from all 
queried hosts. 
• Miscellaneous.  This rule set checks for blank or default passwords within 
daemons and hardware devices.  These plug-ins can determine if an 
initial password was not changed, or left blank after the daemon or 
hardware device installation.  When a password is blank or unchanged, 
an attacker can gain administrative access to the daemon or hardware 
device.  The attacker can also change the password to block authorized 
users.  Nessus will test certain hardware devices and daemons for default 
or blank passwords and alert the administrator if needed. 
• Novell Netware vulnerabilities.  This group of plug-ins was added to Nessus 
too late for inclusion in this study. 
• NIS (Network Information Service) vulnerabilities.  The NIS server gathers 
information about network services.  Systems query the NIS to locate 
appropriate network services.  NIS servers should not be accessible from 
outside of the network.  An outsider can obtain a network layout by 
querying an easily accessible NIS server.  Network layout information will 
help an outsider launch an attack with a higher probability of success. 
• Peer-to-peer file sharing.  Some well-known peer-to-peer file sharing 
programs like Kazaa, Morpheus and Gnutella, if configured incorrectly, 
18 
 allow anyone to access a computer’s file system.  This group of plug-ins 
was added to Nessus too late for inclusion in this study.   
• Nmap port scanning.  Nmap was discussed in Section 2.1.2.1. 
• Sensitive file retrieval vulnerabilities.  Password file retrieval allows an 
attacker to decipher username/password combinations for use in a 
consequent break-in.  Nessus also uses this rule set’s plug-ins to download 
any file with a known path name and file name. 
• Remote Procedure Call (RPC) vulnerabilities.  Although most remote 
procedure calls do not pose an immediate security threat, unused remote 
procedure calls should be disabled in case a vulnerability is discovered in 
the future. 
• SMTP server vulnerabilities.  An SMTP (Simple Mail Transport Protocol) server 
delivers e-mails to their destination.  Some tests in this rule set attempt to 
crash the SMTP server.  Other tests determine if outsiders can use the SMTP 
server to send or relay e-mail.  Nessus detects and alerts administrators of 
these security holes and other undesirable SMTP server settings. 
• Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) information disclosure 
vulnerabilities.  The Simple Network Management Protocol allows 
administrators to gather user, service and executing process information.  
Nessus issues SNMP queries to obtain private system or network 
information. 
• Useless daemons and services.  Some useless daemons and services can 
be exploited to gain user and network information.  Other useless 
daemons and services can be exploited to commandeer network 
bandwidth. 
• Windows vulnerabilities, including absent hotfixes.  As security holes are 
detected in Windows operating systems and applications, Microsoft offers 
patches, or hotfixes, to alleviate the security threat.  Good network 
security practices involve actively patching vulnerable software.  Nessus 
19 
 can detect vulnerabilities that can be patched by applying a hotfix issued 
by Microsoft. 
• Windows Access Control List (ACL) enumeration.  Determining a 
membership of a Windows system ACL can provide a starting point for 
launching attacks against privileged account, such as accounts 
belonging to Administrators or Domain Administrators.  This group of plug-
ins was added to Nessus too late for inclusion in this study. 
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 Chapter 3 
Research Methodology 
 
The study attempted to achieve two goals: first, to try to determine a 
‘level’ of vulnerability of the networks systems of a representative regional 
university, and to determine the attractiveness of a representative regional 
university as a target for exploitation. 
 East Tennessee State University has approximately 3,600 Internet addresses 
in active use by a combination of workstations, servers, hubs, switches, routers, 
printers, print servers and other miscellaneous devices, such as personal digital 
assistants and wireless access points.  Approximately 300 of these network-based 
systems were networking devices; approximately 100 printers/print servers; and 
the remainder, standard computer systems.   
 The study described in this thesis was conducted in three scans.  The first 
two scans featured complete vulnerability checks of the administrative 
networks.  The first sweep began September 23, 2001 and ended December 3, 
2001.  The second sweep began January 7, 2002 and ended February 21, 2002.  
The third, partial scan, which gathered data from about a quarter of the hosts 
on the ETSU network, began January 5, 2004 and ended January 16, 2004. 
 At the time when the first two scans were conducted, ETSU did not use a 
firewall, intrusion detection system or patch management system to protect the 
administrative network.  At that time, the task of patching system software on 
production servers and workstations was the responsibility of systems 
administrators and workstation users, respectively. Between the second and 
third scan, a firewall solution was implemented. 
 Data on potential system vulnerabilities during the first two scans was 
gathered using Nessus version 1.0.9 through 1.1.13.  Nessus plug-ins were 
updated every morning to ensure the detection of newly discovered 
vulnerabilities.  To detect open TCP ports, Nmap version 2.54 beta 30 was used in 
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 conjunction with Nessus.  These programs were hosted on a machine using 
RedHat Linux versions 7.1, and 7.2.  During the third scan, Nessus version 2.0.7, 
Nmap version 3.0 and RedHat Linux version 9.0 were used. 
 Nessus was used to find well-known exploits on ETSU administrative 
network computer systems.  Since the ETSU administrative network 
predominantly consists of Windows machines, unapplied ‘hotfixes’ were 
hypothesized to be the top security threat. 
 Nmap was used to detect unauthorized services hosted on ETSU 
computer systems.  Certain open ports immediately show evidence of a 
compromised system.  For example, a system exhibiting open UDP port 31337 is 
infected with the Back Orifice Trojan. 
 The scans of the ETSU class network, a class B network with approximately 
3,600 live addresses, were conducted as a series of scans of class C address 
spaces.  The ETSU network is logically partitioned into class C virtual LANs, with a 
few virtual LANs using two class C address spaces.  Each virtual LAN represents a 
building on the ETSU campus, or a set of related machines: for example, the 
university’s servers, or core routers, or all machines in a particular lab.  
Accordingly, systems in any given virtual LAN were expected to exhibit common 
traits, such as common software packages, or similar times of deployment. 
 Each class C address space was scanned twice per semester with an 
average of two weeks between scans.  The first scan examined all hosts that 
were ‘live,’ or available for scanning.  The second scan examined hosts with IP 
addresses not ‘live’ during the first scan.  The class C address spaces were 
scanned in the same order during each semester, allowing for a smaller 
deviation of mean time between each complete scan of a class C address 
space.  The number of class C address spaces scanned per day was 
determined by the number that could be scanned serially during a four hour 
time frame, between 8am and 12pm, on weekdays.  Subnets were not scanned 
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 in parallel because of the limited processing power of the machine used to 
gather data. 
 During the third scan, seven subnets with a 255.255.254.0 subnet mask 
were each scanned once.  The only hosts that were scanned were those that 
were ‘live.’  Each subnet was scanned during a seven hour time frame, 
between 9am and 4:30pm on weekdays. 
 Data was analyzed with a program, nsrparser, which was developed for 
this work (see Appendix B).  nsrparser returns any of the following information 
from a Nessus output file in the Nessus NSR format: 
 
• Names or IP addresses, and total count of all hosts. 
• Best guess of host operating system by examining the information returned 
in specific plug-ins. 
• A listing of all plug-ins, with associated descriptions, that returned 
information. 
• All open ports, sorted by number of vulnerabilities exhibited. 
• Names or IP addresses, and total count of hosts with a specific port open. 
• Names or IP addresses, and total count of hosts with vulnerabilities on a 
specific port 
• Names or IP addresses, and total count of hosts with warnings on a 
specific port 
• Names or IP addresses, and total count of hosts with notes on a specific 
port 
• Names or IP addresses, and total count of hosts exhibiting a specific 
vulnerability. 
• Names or IP addresses, and total count of hosts exhibiting a specific 
warning. 
• Names or IP addresses, and total count of hosts exhibiting a specific note. 
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 • Names or IP addresses, and total count of hosts with a specified search 
string located in their plug-in description. 
• Names or IP addresses, and total count of hosts with two specified search 
strings located in plug-in descriptions for that host. 
 
The versions of Nessus used for the first two scans had an important 
limitation: older versions of Nessus catalogued scan data by host IP address and 
not by MAC address.  Accordingly, any host that changed IP addresses during 
the scan might have been scanned twice, or bypassed altogether if the host 
changed IP addresses betweens scans that occurred in a single semester.  The 
standard DHCP lease at the time of the first two scans was three days.  The 
recent versions of Nessus, since 1.1.14, support the option of cataloging hosts by 
MAC address.  The option to use MAC addresses for cataloging would have 
been used if this cataloging method had been available for the first two scans.  
This option was not used during the third scan, as the 512 host subnets were only 
scanned once. 
Hosts that were live during the first scan of a semester were not tested for 
new vulnerabilities by plug-ins downloaded between the two scans.  Nessus 
does have an option to rescan a host for unchecked vulnerabilities.  At the time 
of the first two scans, this option was labeled ‘experimental’ and was avoided to 
minimize incorrect data. 
Hosts that did not reply to a ping were not scanned.  Live hosts utilizing a 
software firewall such as ZoneAlarm or BlackIce Defender that disallow ping 
replies were not scanned.  Allowing Nessus to scan a computer running a 
software firewall could have disrupted the practices of the system’s user as 
ZoneAlarm is normally ‘chatty’ and obtrusive when alerting the system’s user of 
potentially malicious activity. 
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 Nessus plug-ins that emulated denial of service attacks were disabled so 
as not to disrupt a scanned systems operation.  Therefore, vulnerabilities related 
to some denial of service attacks are absent from the data. 
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 Chapter 4 
Data Analysis 
 
The types of vulnerabilities discussed were separated into three main 
categories, local, network, and client.  A local vulnerability can only be 
exploited through an interactive login of the machine.  A remote vulnerability 
may be exploited when the susceptible machine is connected to a network.  
Client vulnerabilities may be exploited when the subject machine connects to a 
malicious host. 
 Each of these three categories was further separated into five 
subcategories, listed in order of increasing severity, based on the end result of a 
successful exploit.   
 
• Information disclosure – A machine offers information about itself, its users 
or the network it is connected to that helps malicious parties learn more 
about the subject, or other possible subjects. 
• Denial of Service – An exploit renders a service on any machine disabled 
or unreachable by authorized clients. 
• Readable Service – An exploit offers read access of a service to an 
unauthorized client. 
• Writeable Service – An exploit offers read and/or write access of a service 
to an unauthorized client. 
• Privilege Elevation – An exploit grants the malicious party ‘higher’ 
privileges than a standard guest or user account.  In most cases, this refers 
to an unauthorized party gaining “root” or “administrator” access. 
 
Based on the availability of the vulnerable service, vulnerabilities were 
classified as active and dormant.  The term dormant was chosen over inactive 
because of the uncertainty that a vulnerable service would be available in the 
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 future.  The term total will refer to the sum of all active and dormant 
vulnerabilities. 
 Nessus categorizes its findings into one of three categories: vulnerability, 
warning and info.  When referencing these categories, the terms critical 
vulnerability, warning, and informational discovery are used to refer to what 
Nessus categorizes as a ‘vulnerability’, a ‘warning,’ and an ‘info’, respectively.   
 
4.1.  Most Vulnerable Ports 
 
Each of the two initial Nessus scans identified ports 139 (SMB over 
NetBIOS), 161 (SNMP), 80 (HTTP), 21 (FTP), and 25 (SMTP) as the five most 
vulnerable ports, ordered by number of critical vulnerabilities.  The top five 
vulnerable ports remained consistent across the two initial scans. 
 Port 139, used by SMB over NetBIOS, was the most vulnerable port during 
both scans.  During Fall 2001, the 11,450 port 139 critical vulnerabilities 
accounted for 83.3% of the total number of discovered critical vulnerabilities.  
During Spring 2002, the 7,042 port 139 critical vulnerabilities accounted for 75.4% 
of all discovered critical vulnerabilities.  Port 139 vulnerabilities are detailed in  
Section 4.1.1. 
 Port 161, used by SNMP, was the second most vulnerable port during both 
scans.  All of these critical vulnerabilities were of the information disclosure 
variety.  The information found from these scans was limited to the ‘default’ 
SNMP community strings of ‘public’ and ‘private’.  During Fall 2001, the 1,391 
port 161 critical vulnerabilities accounted for 10.1% of the total number of 
discovered critical vulnerabilities.  During Spring 2002, the 1,218 port 161 critical 
vulnerabilities accounted for 13.0% of the total number of discovered critical 
vulnerabilities. 
 Port 80, used by HTTP servers, was the third most vulnerable port during 
both scans.  During Fall 2001, eighty different critical vulnerabilities were 
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 discovered that involved port 80 services.  During Spring 2002, the number of 
unique critical vulnerabilities fell to sixty-eight.  Port 80 vulnerabilities are detailed 
in Section 4.1.2. 
 Port 21, used by FTP daemons, was the fourth most vulnerable port during 
both scans.  During Fall 2001, the 137 port 21 critical vulnerabilities accounted for 
1.0% of the total number of detected critical vulnerabilities.  During Spring 2002, 
the 193 port 21 critical vulnerabilities accounted for 2.0% of the total number of 
discovered critical vulnerabilities.  Port 21 vulnerabilities are summarized in 
Section 4.1.3. 
 Port 25, used by SMTP servers, was the fifth most vulnerable port during 
both scans.  During Fall 2001, the 120 port 25 critical vulnerabilities accounted for 
slightly less than 1% of the total number of detected critical vulnerabilities.  
During Spring 2002, the 128 port 25 critical vulnerabilities accounted for 1.3% of 
the total number of discovered critical vulnerabilities.  Port 25 vulnerabilities are 
summarized in Section 4.1.4. 
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Figure 1.  Top twenty ports by critical vulnerabilities, Fall 2001. 
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 Top 20 ports by critical vulnerabilities, Spring 2002
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Figure 2.  Top twenty ports by critical vulnerabilities, Spring 2002. 
 
Port 1900, used by Universal Plug and Play, showed no critical 
vulnerabilities during the Fall 2001 scan, but exhibited eighty-three critical 
vulnerabilities, ranked sixth in total critical vulnerabilities during the Spring 2002 
scan.  This anomaly can be attributed to the discovery of a buffer overflow 
vulnerability in the Universal Plug and Play service disclosed December 20, 2001 
as outlined in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS01-059. 
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 Table 1.  Percent change in critical vulnerabilities, Fall 2001 and Spring 2002. 
port Fall 2001 Spring 2002 % change 
all 13735 9339 -32.0 
139 11450 7042 -38.5 
161 1391 1218 -12.4 
80 257 230 -10.5 
21 137 193 40.9 
25 120 128 6.7 
1234 32 49 53.1 
631 31 26 -16.1 
7070 28 18 -35.7 
280 28 18 -35.7 
23 24 29 20.8 
8081 17 0 -100.0 
1433 10 10 0.0 
5800 4 14 250.0 
443 3 44 1366.7 
1900 0 83 N/A 
 
4.1.1.  Port 139 vulnerabilities 
 
NetBIOS applications employ NetBIOS mechanisms to locate 
resources, establish connections, send and receive data with an 
application peer, and terminate connections [RFC1001]. 
 
Windows machines use NetBIOS services for authentication and service 
sharing.  The Windows implementation of NetBIOS uses ports 135, 137, 138 and 
139.  Port 139, the SMB over NetBIOS session port, was the most widely used of 
these four ports during the Fall 2001 and Spring 2002 scans. 
  A NetBIOS null session allows a machine, or a user of that machine, to 
gather information about another machine’s users, shares, and services.  
Windows processes, for example, use null sessions to browse for network services 
and relay the findings to the system’s user.  In these service ‘browsing’ sessions, a 
username and password is not used.  Null sessions can be considered a security 
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 risk because of the amount of information they can provide about a victim.  
However, they are a necessary part of the Windows service architecture.  Nessus 
uses null sessions to gather information about the host, including local and 
domain SIDs, local and domain usernames, file and printer shares and 
characteristic information about the local user of the host, such as group 
memberships. 
 Some of the vulnerabilities discovered through scans of port 139 are not 
exploitable through a network.  Others require a local user account, or the 
ability to interact with the machine. 
 
4.1.1.1.  Privilege Elevation vulnerabilities 
  
Nine different privilege elevation vulnerabilities were discovered using 
information collected from scans of port 139 during both semesters. 
 A buffer overflow vulnerability in Index Server v2 for Windows NT allows 
remote attackers to run code with system privileges.  The Spring 2002 scan 
showed 515 machines with this vulnerability, down from 1000 machines the 
previous semester.  The information gathered in the scan fails to show how many 
of these systems utilized Index Server v2.  Systems running Windows NT and IIS 
would have had the greatest probability of running Index Server v2 since both IIS 
and Index Server v2 are part of Windows NT Option Pack 1 [MS01-025].  Only a 
single machine during this scan, ats.etsu.edu, used Windows NT and IIS and 
exhibited this vulnerability.  ats.etsu.edu has since been decommissioned. 
 A vulnerability in the parsing algorithm for IIS versions 4 and 5 could allow 
a remote attacker to run code with system privileges [MS00-086].  The Spring 
2002 scan showed 158 machines with this vulnerability, down from 338 machines 
the previous semester.  None of the seventy machines that offered various IIS 
services exhibited this vulnerability.  In all cases, this vulnerability was classified as 
dormant. 
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  The autologon option in Windows NT based operating systems allows the 
administrator to be interactively logged onto the machine with a blank 
password.  This option would allow a local or remote attacker administrative 
access to the machine.  Two machines on campus exhibited this active 
vulnerability, but have since been reconfigured as the result of one being 
compromised on April 2, 2002, detailed in Section 5.1. 
 All local privilege elevation vulnerabilities are classified as active because 
any user that can interactively login to a machine can exploit these 
vulnerabilities.  Since these vulnerabilities can not be exploited remotely, they 
are classified local information disclosure.  A legitimate user of ETSU 
administrative network system could use this information to determine 
exploitable workstations.  The following summarizes local privilege elevation 
vulnerabilities discovered on the ETSU administrative network: 
 
• Exploitable flaws exist in certain local procedure call (LPC) 
implementations in the Windows NT and 2000 operating systems.  
Machines not running Windows 2000 Service Pack 2 and Windows NT 
machines not patched after the release of Windows NT Service Pack 6a 
are vulnerable (236 machines as of Spring 2002) [MS00-070].  
• Windows NT and Windows 2000 machines not patched against the 
‘Relative Shell Path’ vulnerability allow a local user to insert any 
executable to be run in place of the Windows ‘explorer’ shell.  The 
privileges gained by the malicious code would reflect those of the person 
interacting with the machine.  (236 machines as of Spring 2002) [MS00-
052]. 
• Vulnerabilities in the ‘domain account lockout’ policy of Windows 2000 
allow users to brute force passwords, including those of the administrator.  
Only machines running Windows 2000 Service Pack 1 are affected [MS00-
089]. 
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 • The ‘Still Image’ service, normally used with scanners and digital cameras, 
can elevate the privilege of any local user.  This service is automatically 
installed by Windows 2000 and runs as a service after a digital imaging 
device has been attached to the machine.  Machines not patched with 
Windows 2000 Service Pack 2 are exploitable by this vulnerability (191 
machines as of Spring 2002) [MS00-065]. 
• A defect in the Service Control Manager within Windows 2000 allows 
malicious users to impersonate elevated privilege services.  Machines not 
patched with Windows 2000 Service Pack 2 are vulnerable (190 machines 
as of Spring 2002) [MS00-053]. 
• The Windows NT LAN Manager Security Support Provider allows code to 
be executed with operating system level rights.  Windows NT machines not 
patched since Service Pack 6a are susceptible to this exploit (40 
machines as of Spring 2002) [MS01-008]. 
 
4.1.1.2.  Writeable Service vulnerabilities 
 
Five active writeable service vulnerabilities were discovered on TCP port 
139 during the scans of the ETSU administrative network.  The four vulnerabilities 
most often exposed by the scan have many commonalities.  The fifth, 
uncovered on only two machines, is inherent to Linux, an operating system that 
does not natively support the SMB over NetBIOS interface, but can with 
packages such as Samba. 
The main writeable service vulnerabilities involve Windows registry entries 
that can be edited by system users that lack administrative privileges.  In all 
cases, the registry entries were associated with programs or dynamic link libraries 
that execute automatically upon startup/logon.  A malicious party that could 
edit these entries could cause a program to execute without a legitimate user’s 
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 knowledge.  Spyware and backdoors are examples of programs that could 
exploit this vulnerability. 
 From the data analysis, these vulnerabilities seem to be limited to Windows 
NT 4.  An attacker with permission to log onto a Windows NT 4 system could edit 
these values remotely.  Most Windows NT 4 machines on the ETSU administrative 
network use a domain login procedure and support no local accounts, except 
for those installed by default.  The above analysis would suggest that this 
vulnerability be classified as local.  However, an unsuspecting user could 
execute a virus that edits these registry keys to execute the virus’ payload upon 
startup.  In this scenario, this vulnerability would be classified as client.  In this 
study, this vulnerability was considered local. 
 Samba is an open source program developed for various UNIX and Linux 
implementations that allows UNIX and Linux machines to interface with Windows 
file and printer sharing services.  An implementation flaw allows for random 
creation of files on the machine using Samba.  Fortunately, the files created may 
only have the extension ‘.log’, which prevents the overwriting of configuration or 
other important files.  Two machines on the ETSU administrative network 
exhibited this remote writeable service vulnerability. 
 
4.1.1.3.  Readable Service vulnerabilities 
 
Five readable service vulnerabilities were identified by the Fall 2001 and 
Spring 2002 scans of the ETSU administrative network.  The most dangerous of 
these vulnerabilities allows for retrieval of information that could be used to gain 
complete control over the vulnerable machine. 
 
• During the Spring 2002 scan, 1832 machines allowed Nessus to login 
remotely, either through the use of a valid username/password 
combination or through the use of a null session. 
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 • 1088 machines did not have the registry properly “locked down” and 
were accessible to non-administrators 
• 110 machines had file or print shares that were accessible to anyone on 
the ETSU administrative network. 
• Sixty-seven machines exhibited a vulnerability that allows a password 
protected file or print share to be accessed using a special request 
containing only the first character of the password [MS00-072]. 
 
The most dangerous readable service vulnerability allows a remote user to 
access the Windows registry entry containing the password for the VNC service.  
Virtual Network Computing (VNC) is a service that allows remote desktop 
control similar to Symantec’s pcANYWHERE, Laplink Gold or the Remote Desktop 
feature found in Windows XP Professional Edition.  An attacker who could read 
this registry entry could leverage the information to take complete control of the 
victim machine.  This vulnerability was found on ten machines during the Fall 
2001 scan and seven machines during the Spring 2002 scan. 
 
4.1.1.4.  Denial of Service vulnerabilities 
 
A buffer overflow error in the Windows 2000 infrared protocol could cause 
the locally exploitable machine to reboot [MS01-046].  A very high percentage 
of machines in this study (>99%) probably lack infrared capabilities, leading to a 
dormant classification.  During the Spring 2002 scan, 478 machines were not 
patched to protect against this vulnerability, down from 922 machines the 
previous semester. 
 An implementation error in IP fragment reassembly could cause a 
computer to utilize 100% CPU in attempting to recreate a malformed IP packet, 
thus denying service to other applications using the CPU [MS00-029].  The Fall 
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 2001 scan showed 920 machines that could be exploited using this vulnerability. 
The Spring 2002 scan showed 237 machines that were vulnerable to this attack. 
 A vulnerability in the computer browsing protocol of Windows NT and 
Windows 2000 machines allows for a malicious machine to become a master 
browser and deny service to those services normally indexed by a master 
browser [MS00-036].  The Spring 2002 scan discovered 237 machines vulnerable 
to this attack.  During Fall 2001, 920 systems were vulnerable to this attack.  
 A deficiency in the “industry-standard” NetBIOS interface allows any 
Windows NT or Windows 2000 machine to act as a malicious WINS server, 
denying service to services on a victim machine.  The malicious machine could 
request a victim machine to release its NETBIOS name, rendering the services on 
the victim machine unreachable [MS00-047].  917 machines were vulnerable to 
this attack during Fall 2001.  236 were vulnerable to this attack during the Spring 
2002 scan. 
 A remote procedure call (RPC) vulnerability in Windows 2000 machines 
allows a malformed RPC request to crash the service, thereby denying access to 
the RPC service. Although all Windows 2000 machines are susceptible to this 
vulnerability, machines running Windows 2000 Server are at the greatest risk 
[MS00-066].  Only four machines of the 190 marked ‘vulnerable’ were 
fingerprinted as running Windows 2000 Server, and categorized as machines for 
which this vulnerability was active. 
 A second well-known RPC vulnerability allows an attacker to remove a 
victim machine from a domain, leaving it unable to attach to domain resources.  
The Microsoft Security Bulletin MS00-062 also states an exploited domain 
controller would not allow domain logins, disallowing all domain users from 
domain resources.  All versions of Windows 2000 Gold are vulnerable except 
Windows 2000 Datacenter Server.  Machines patched with Windows 2000 
Service Pack 1 are immune to this exploit [MS00-062].  As of the Spring 2002 scan, 
111 machines were not patched against this vulnerability.  Two of these 111 
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 machines used Windows 2000 Server: neither, however, was a Windows 2000 
Datacenter Server system. 
 A third RPC vulnerability denial of service vulnerability affects only 
Windows NT Server based machines.  Sending a malformed request to the 
service causes the service to halt.  Machines not patched since the release of 
Windows NT Service Pack 6a are vulnerable to this exploit [MS01-048].  Of the 48 
systems that showed evidence of this vulnerability during the Spring 2002 scan, 
eleven use Windows NT Server. 
 Incomplete TCP/IP packets sent to port 139 of vulnerable Windows 9x or 
Windows NT machine could cause the victim machine to stop responding to all 
network traffic.  The Windows 9x machines are only vulnerable if file and printer 
sharing is enabled.  Windows NT machines are vulnerable if the ‘server’ service is 
running, which is active by default [MS00-091].  All forty systems found with this 
potential vulnerability during the Spring 2002 scan used a variant of Windows NT.   
 A programming error in the Windows NT Point-To-Point Tunneling Protocol 
(PPTP) causes a memory leak that could be used to exhaust available memory 
on the victim machine, rendering all services useless [MS01-009].  Of the forty 
machines with this potential vulnerability, none are believed to offer any PPTP 
services.  Since this vulnerability is not exploitable on any machines attached to 
the ETSU administrative network, this vulnerability was classified as dormant. 
 Windows NT Server and Windows NT Terminal Server are vulnerable to a 
local exploit that could cause access to all services to be denied.  The 
vulnerability allows the malicious user to dominate the usage of the TCP/IP stack, 
making it unusable by other services [MS01-003].  Two of the forty machines that 
were not patched against this vulnerability use Windows NT Server. 
 The scan detected exactly one vulnerability in the Fall 2001 scan missing 
during the Spring 2002 scan.  This vulnerability, when exploited, causes a domain 
controller to devote a large percentage of its CPU time to processing 
misinformation.  During the Fall 2001 scan, 757 machines were potentially 
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 vulnerable, but none of these 757 machines were domain controllers.  This 
vulnerability was not discovered during the Spring 2002 scan because the 
Microsoft Security Bulletin that originally disclosed information about this 
vulnerability was superseded by another Microsoft Security Bulletin, which 
caused this plug-in to become obsolete [MS01-011]. 
 
4.1.1.5.  Information Disclosure vulnerabilities 
 
The following information disclosure vulnerabilities were detected during 
the Spring 2002 scan. 
 
• 1,681 machines disclosed information about their native LAN Manager, 
operating system and workgroup/domain. 
• 1,671 machines disclosed their domain SID. 
• 1,579 machines disclosed users of the domain when presented with their 
acquired domain SID. 
• 1,150 machines allowed remote registry access. 
• 348 machines disclosed their browse list of other hosts on the network. 
• 299 machines disclosed their host SID. 
• 297 machines disclosed users of the host when presented with their 
acquired host SID. 
• 198 machines disclosed all of their available file and printer shares. 
• 191 machines allowed for retrieval of a hashed password through a client 
vulnerability for an offline brute-force attack [MS00-067]. 
• 191 machines were Windows 2000 machines not patched with Service 
Pack 2. 
• 168 machines disclosed all services currently running on the machine. 
• Eight machines disclosed they were a primary domain controller or a 
backup domain controller. 
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 • Six machines were Windows NT machines not patched with Service Pack 
6a. 
 
4.1.1.6.  Port 139 Vulnerabilities summary 
 
Table 2.  Summary of port 139 vulnerabilities by classification. 
 Active & 
Remote 
Active & 
Local 
Dormant & 
Remote 
Dormant & 
Local 
Privilege 
elevation  2 849 673 0 
Writeable 
service 511 0 0 0 
Readable 
service 3104 0 0 0 
Denial of 
Service 861 0 278 518 
Information 
Disclosure 7787 0 0 0 
 
The most dangerous vulnerabilities are classified as active, remote and 
privilege elevation.  Two of these vulnerabilities existed in over 3,900 machines 
scanned during the Spring 2002 semester.  One of these vulnerabilities was 
leveraged on April 2, 2002 as described in Section 5.1.  Both machines with these 
potentially destructive vulnerabilities were administered by the same person, 
and their vulnerabilities have since been remedied. 
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 4.1.2.  Port 80 vulnerabilities 
 
Port 80 is used by the HTTP protocol, mainly in conjunction with web 
access.  Many different web server software packages are in use on the 
Internet, but in an environment where a very large percentage of the systems 
use the Windows operating system, it can be assumed that Internet Information 
Services (IIS) is the most widely used web server. 
 Correlations between the operating system in use and the version of IIS 
used were used -- Windows NT uses IIS version 4 and Windows 2000 uses IIS 
version 5 -- to determine false positives in the collected data.  In certain cases, a 
vulnerability may have been detected by reading the host registry and 
determining that a patch had not been applied.  This vulnerability may only be 
exploitable through certain versions of IIS.   
 
4.1.2.1.  Privilege Elevation vulnerabilities 
 
Forty-six different privilege elevation vulnerabilities were discovered using 
information collected from scans of port 80 during both semesters.  Only the top 
six vulnerabilities are reviewed, since a possible anomaly in Nessus’ analysis of a 
host (see Section 4.1.2.6) may have increased the number of reported 
vulnerabilities.  All data in this section and the following section include the data 
recovered and categorized as a possible anomaly. 
A buffer overflow vulnerability within the Windows Indexing Service used 
by IIS allows remote attackers to run code with system privileges [MS01-033]. The 
Spring 2002 scan showed fifty-four machines with this vulnerability, up from forty 
machines the previous semester.  This vulnerability was the one exploited by the 
Code Red worm, launched July 12, 2001.  In the Fall 2001 scan, seven machines 
exhibited remnants of a Code Red infection, proving this can be classified as an 
active and remote vulnerability. 
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 Forty-six machines exhibited a buffer overflow vulnerability in the Internet 
Printing Protocol, installed and activated by default in IIS 5.  This vulnerability is 
technically similar to the previously discussed Windows Indexing Service 
vulnerability, except the exploit uses a different protocol.  With the transition to 
Windows 2000 from Windows NT, the number of machines that exhibited this 
vulnerability nearly doubled from twenty-seven in the Fall 2001 semester.  All 
machines that exhibited this vulnerability reported as a Windows 2000 Machine 
with port 80 available.  This vulnerability was classified as active and remote. 
A component of the Microsoft Data Access Components contains a 
vulnerability that allows code execution, and the ability to read secured files 
[MS99-025].  Only IIS 3 and 4 are vulnerable to this exploit, and of the thirty-one 
machines labeled by Nessus to be vulnerable, eleven were using Windows NT 
and IIS 4. 
Social engineering is needed to fully exploit a cross-site scripting 
vulnerability that plagued nineteen machines during the Fall 2001 scan.  In cross-
site scripting, a user of malicious site B is tricked into thinking they are browsing 
desired site A.  Data entered on site B is passed to site A, along with malicious 
code that is unchecked by site A and executed on the users client machine 
[Securiteam].  Since this vulnerability takes such elaborate engineering and is 
not a readily available exploit, it was classified as dormant and client. 
Microsoft offers a tool that hardens an IIS installation that “[turns] off 
unnecessary features, thus reducing attack surface available to attackers.” 
[Microsoft1]  Fifteen machines still exhibited services normally disabled by the IIS 
lockdown tool.  This number is up from seven machines with this vulnerability 
during Fall 2001.  Since vulnerabilities were found with these services, this 
vulnerability was classified active and remote. 
A CGI script associated with SQL administration allows an attacker to send 
arbitrary commands to the script’s host system because a variable the script 
accepts is not checked for correct syntax.  To execute this exploit, the attacker 
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 must have administrative access to the SQL server.  However, there is a well-
known exploit in which the default administrator account for the SQL server, the 
‘sa’ account, is created with a blank password.  A combination of a blank ‘sa’ 
password and this CGI makes the system vulnerable to a remote exploit.  Since 
none of the systems checked had a blank ‘sa’ password this vulnerability was 
classified as dormant.  Nine systems during the Spring 2002 scan showed the 
availability of this CGI, down from fourteen the previous semester. 
Findings concerning other privilege elevation vulnerabilities and those 
listed above are summarized in Section 4.1.2.7. 
 
4.1.2.2.  Writeable Service vulnerabilities 
 
Eight different writeable service vulnerabilities were discovered during the 
Spring 2002 scan.  Only the top two of these vulnerabilities are reviewed 
because of the Nessus anomaly. 
A web-accessible executable for IIS version 3 named ‘newdsn’ allows an 
attacker to create arbitrary files on the vulnerable host.  The ‘newdsn’ script, like 
any web-accessible sample executable or script, should be removed in a 
production environment.  Removing vulnerable sample applications is one 
purpose of the IIS Lockdown Tool discussed in the previous section.  Five systems 
during the Spring 2002 scan were potentially vulnerable to this exploit.  Since 
three of these systems used the Windows NT 4 operating system, this may be 
classified as an active and remote vulnerability [xforce3]. 
 A Sambar web server allows an attacker to use a Perl script for sending e-
mail without proper credentials.  This was classified as a writeable service 
vulnerability because it allows the attacker to use the service in an undesired 
manner, but does not allow for an elevation of privileges.  Because none of the 
servers involved truly used the Sambar web server, this has been classified as a 
dormant remote vulnerability. 
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 4.1.2.3.  Readable Service vulnerabilities 
 
Sixteen different readable service vulnerabilities were discovered during 
the Spring 2002 scan, of which only the top three vulnerabilities are reviewed. 
IIS versions 4 and 5 include an administration page that allows any user to 
change their domain password by entering the account name and current 
password.  This page and its password change option may be accessed 
repeatedly without the attacker being locked out.  Therefore, the attacker 
could be able to discern a password by brute force.  Twenty systems, all using 
the Windows NT4 or Windows 2000 server operating systems, had this 
administration page available to the anonymous browser.  Twelve systems had 
this administration page available during the Fall 2001 scan.  This vulnerability 
was classified as active and remote. 
 Twelve systems running IIS had a sample application installed with a 
vulnerability that allows an attacker to list the contents of any directory on a 
server; nine more than the previous semester.  This sample application would 
normally be removed when the IIS lockdown tool was used to harden the web 
service.  This vulnerability was also classified as active and remote. 
 Four systems running IIS were configured to support unrestricted 
administrative access from remote websites.  This allows attackers that know or 
can decipher the username and password of an IIS administrator to use the 
administration applications.  Since these administration pages can be reached 
from remote machines, and the URLs of these pages are well known, this was 
classified as an active vulnerability. 
 
4.1.2.4.  Denial of Service vulnerabilities 
 
Six vulnerabilities, when exploited, would deny access to a system service.  
Two of these are examined in this section.  The remaining vulnerabilities are not 
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 reviewed because of the possible anomaly that may have skewed the count of 
total vulnerabilities. 
The first vulnerability was labeled by Nessus as a denial of service 
vulnerability, but the description given by Nessus was too vague for further 
analysis: 
 
It may be possible to make the web server execute arbitrary code 
or crash by sending it a too authorization.  Risk factor: High 
 
Of the seventeen devices listed with this vulnerability, fifteen of them were 
a variety of print device.  The remaining two were MacOS platforms.  One of 
these two systems was a known web server.  The other system, whose IP address 
did not resolve to a hostname, was probably not an advertised web server.  
Since this vulnerability could not be studied, but was reported by Nessus, it was 
categorized as a remote, dormant vulnerability. 
A vulnerability discovered on four systems causes a denial of service to the 
web server when exploited. 
 
A denial of service vulnerability (exists) that could enable an 
attacker to temporarily disrupt service on an IIS 5.0 web server. 
WebDAV doesn’t correctly handle particular type of very long, 
invalid request. Such a request would cause the IIS 5.0 service to fail 
[MS01-044].  
 
This vulnerability can be categorized as an active, remote vulnerability. 
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 4.1.2.5.  Information Disclosure vulnerabilities 
 
The following information about machines on the ETSU administrative 
network was determined during the Spring 2002 scan. 
 
• 174 machines advertised their web server software and version number.   
• Fifty-three machines used Microsoft FrontPage Extensions. 
• Twenty-one machines had FrontPage related, world-readable files that 
contain server configuration information. 
• Eighteen machines had a robots.txt file that contains information about 
the web site directory structure. 
• Fourteen machines used a version of Perl that returns the directory of the 
virtual web server when confronted with a request to a non-existent Perl 
script. 
• Ten machines using Apache would have disclose legitimate usernames of 
system users. 
• Four machines offered an IIS administration file which would have allowed 
anyone to view the directory structure of the machine. 
• Three machines used a CGI script that returns environment variables 
 
4.1.2.6.  Port 80 anomalies 
 
Data from security audits should be verified when possible since tools like 
Nessus may generate false positives or fail to detect existing vulnerabilities.  The 
author of this study lacked the authority to verify the data reported from Nessus 
and relied largely on the tool’s ability to validate the data, and the plausibility of 
the data.  One implausible situation involved a system named forbesm.etsu.edu 
that allegedly exhibited forty-five different port 80 vulnerabilities.  In many cases, 
this system was the only system to display any of these vulnerabilities.  The 
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 validity of the scan was investigated by attempting to exploit some of the 
readable service vulnerabilities using information returned by Nessus plug-ins.  
None of the attempted exploits resulted in a positive result.  Although it could 
not be determined if all detected vulnerabilities were false positives for reasons 
of web server integrity, it seemed ‘likely’ that most (>90%) of the Nessus reported 
data on this system was false.  
 Since no other anomalies were discovered during the analysis phase of 
this study, the author regards all other data from Nessus as reliable.  
 
4.1.2.7.  Port 80 Vulnerabilities Summary 
 
Table 3.  Summary of port 80 total vulnerabilities by classification. 
 Active & 
Remote 
Active & 
Local 
Dormant & 
Remote 
Dormant & 
Local 
Privilege 
elevation  202 0 49 0 
Writeable 
service 28 0 5 0 
Readable 
service 55 0 0 0 
Denial of 
Service 8 0 17 0 
Information 
Disclosure 314 0 0 0 
 
During the Fall 2001 scan Nessus discovered 164 critical vulnerabilities, 171 
warnings and 174 informational discoveries that have been categorized above.   
 
4.1.3.  Port 21 Vulnerabilities 
 
Port 21, is the TCP port most widely used by File Transfer Protocol (FTP).  
During the Spring 2002 scan, 189 devices had services available on port 21.  
Eleven different vulnerabilities were discovered, all of the remote and active 
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 variety.  Sixty-nine of the vulnerabilities allowed for some type of privilege 
elevation.  No vulnerabilities were discovered that allowed an attacker to 
upload files to arbitrary locations on the FTP site.  Eighty-four vulnerabilities were 
discovered that allowed anonymous users to browse the FTP site.  No 
vulnerabilities that would disclose information about the system were 
discovered. 
 The most notable of these vulnerabilities were the eighty-four 
vulnerabilities related to anonymous FTP access.  Nmap operating system 
fingerprint data showed all of the devices to be IP printers or print server devices.  
No file data is stored on any of these devices.  It is unknown what the FTP 
services on these machines are used for.  These systems probably receive print 
data on port 21, or use this port for downloading firmware or software systems 
upgrades. 
 In fifteen cases, a vulnerability in the Washington University FTP daemon 
that is found on many Linux distributions allows an attacker with a valid account 
or anonymous access to exploit the vulnerability to run arbitrary code as root.  
This vulnerability was found on seven Linux systems, five AIX systems and one 
Solaris system.  Two print devices were also listed as having this vulnerability.  
None of the systems with the vulnerability allowed anonymous access.  If it was 
assumed that the FTP servers had at least one standard user on them, then the 
server could be considered active against this remote exploit [xforce1]. 
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 Table 4.  Summary of Port 21 vulnerabilities by classification. 
 
 
Active & 
Remote 
Active & 
Local 
Dormant & 
Remote 
Dormant & 
Local 
Privilege 
elevation  69 0 0 0 
Writeable 
service 0 0 0 0 
Readable 
service 84 0 0 0 
Denial of 
Service 42 0 0 0 
Information 
Disclosure 0 0 0 0 
 
4.1.4.  Port 25 vulnerabilities 
 
Port 25 is most widely used by the Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) for 
sending electronic mail.  During the Spring 2002 scan, seventy-two devices had 
services available on port 25.  Twelve of the vulnerabilities allowed for an 
elevation in privileges.  Eleven of these vulnerabilities, however, required an 
interactive session with the system.  Thirty-one vulnerabilities allowed for an 
attacker to use the service for writing.  Fifty-two vulnerabilities allowed for 
information disclosure. 
 The single remote, active privilege elevation vulnerability was discovered 
on an AIX system.  The Nessus plug-in information states that a HELO command 
with an argument over 12,000 characters causes a buffer overflow that can 
allow arbitrary code execution.  The remainder of the privilege elevation 
vulnerabilities can only be exploited from the local host since the buffer overflow 
that causes the vulnerability involves the processing of the sendmail ‘–bt’ switch 
argument. 
 The writable service vulnerability discovered allows the attacker to write 
arbitrary files to the SMTP server system by forging the receipt field with an 
absolute file path and file name.  The SMTP server does not validate the 
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 information in this fieldreceipts.  The Nessus plug-in warns that this information 
could be a false positive because of the ways in which different mail servers 
react to such a request.  Some servers respond positively, while others may 
ignore the message without notifying the sender.  To verify the validity of each 
reported vulnerability would require file system access. 
 The information disclosure vulnerabilities were “banner” responses that 
allow the attacker to retrieve the name and sometimes the version of the mail 
server being used.  The attacker could use this information to see if well-known 
vulnerabilities exist for the server being examined. 
 
Table 5.  Summary of port 25 vulnerabilities by classification. 
 Active & 
Remote 
Active & 
Local 
Dormant & 
Remote 
Dormant & 
Local 
Privilege 
elevation  1 11 0 0 
Writeable 
service 31 0 0 0 
Readable 
service 0 0 0 0 
Denial of 
Service 0 0 0 0 
Information 
Disclosure 52 0 0 0 
 
4.2.  Spring 2004 and Spring 2002 
 
Since the initial scan during the Fall 2001 and Spring 2002 semesters, and 
the follow-up scan during the Spring 2004 semester, there was one major 
change to the ETSU administrative network.  A firewall protecting the entire 
campus administrative network from the Internet was implemented.  Almost all 
(>99%) of the 65,535 TCP ports are blocked globally, and requests for open ports 
in the firewall to a single host must be registered.  This change has helped 
reduce the vulnerabilitiy of the campus network to outside attacks.  However, if 
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 an attacker has availability to the ETSU administrative network, their attacks will 
not be stopped by a firewall or intrusion detection system.   
 The administrative network’s vulnerability to internal attack was exposed 
in 2003 when an ETSU employee inadvertently plugged a laptop infected with 
the MSBlast worm into the ETSU administrative network.  Since ETSU does not 
automate their management of patching systems, the worm penetrated a 
significant portion of the network, disrupting services, and, at its peak, passing 
more than 50,000 infected messages a day through the ETSU mail server. 
 A final partial sweep of the ETSU administrative network conducted during 
the Spring semester of 2004 scanned 909 of the estimated 3,600 hosts.  This scan 
was expected to show similar numbers in the number of critical vulnerabilities 
per host, and the number of critical vulnerabilities per port.  Once the analysis of 
the data was completed, it was discovered that the number of critical 
vulnerabilities per host increased, whereas the top three vulnerable ports 
registered zero critical vulnerabilities during the Spring 2002 audit. 
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 4.2.1.  Spring 2004 Summary 
Top 20 ports by critical vulnerabilities, Spring 2004
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Figure 3.  Top twenty ports by critical vulnerabilities, Spring 2004. 
 
Port 445, the port most widely used by SMB over TCP/IP, exhibited the most 
vulnerabilities during the Spring 2004 semester.  Port 8083 vulnerabilities which 
numbered 506 during the Spring 2004 semester are discussed in the following 
section.  The NetBIOS RPC end point mapper, port 135, rose to the third most 
vulnerable port.  The next four most vulnerable ports were all in the top five most 
vulnerable during the 2002 scan: 80 (HTTP), 161 (SNMP), 21 (FTP), and SMB over 
NetBIOS (139). 
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 4.2.1.1.  Port 8083 
 
Port 8083 is a non-standard port chosen for use by the McAfee Framework 
Service.  ETSU uses this service to deploy and manage the McAfee VirusScan 
Enterprise product on ETSU workstations using ePolicy Orchestrator as its 
centralized console.  Five different vulnerabilities were discovered during the 
Spring 2004 scan. 
 One of these port 8083 vulnerabilities was related to a buffer overflow in a 
.dll used by FrontPage Extensions.  This vulnerability was only discovered on three 
machines using a Windows operating system.  It is hypothesized that the systems 
in question used another software package that also used port 8083. 
 A second port 8083 vulnerability can be exploited utilizing an unchecked 
buffer in one of the core operating system components in Windows 2000 and 
Windows XP.  To exploit this vulnerability, the vulnerable system must be using IIS 
version 5 or 6.  This vulnerability allows the attacker to run arbitrary code.  Only 
one Windows XP machine was located with this vulnerability [MS03-007]. 
 The remaining three vulnerabilities involve a directory traversal 
vulnerability.  To exploit this vulnerability, a client sends a correctly formulated 
request to a server that contains character sequences normally reserved for 
changing directories, such as ‘../’.  Hosts that are vulnerable to this exploit allow 
these requests to access directories outside the scope of the available web 
root.  The exploit allows an attacker to access directories normally denied 
access to anonymous web browsers. 
 Through testing, it was determined that the ePolicy Orchestrator Agent 
(ePOAgent) client is susceptible to a simple directory traversal exploit using ‘…/’ 
as the character sequence to access a parent directory.  The ETSU configuration 
for this service places the home directory for these services six folders below the 
root folder of the system partition.  The attacker can retrieve a file by forming a 
request that begins with ‘http//hostname:8083/…/…/…/…/…/…/’ and 
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 appending the directories and name of a known any file.  The files available to 
the attacker are any files that are not hidden and readable by the NTFS 
‘everyone’ group.  This exploit can only read the system partition, and can not 
access other partitions.  Also, the exact name and location of the file must be 
known since this attack method does not offer directory listings.  A quick Internet 
search uncovered no information regarding this vulnerability.  One listing on the 
ISS X-Force database had an entry that was similar to the exploit described 
above: 
 
McAfee AsaP VirusScan is a Web-based AntiVirus service for remote 
clients that uses the myCIO HTTP server to transfer virus definitions. 
McAfee AsaP VirusScan could allow a remote attacker to traverse 
directories on the Web server. A remote attacker can send a 
specially-crafted URL request containing modified "dot dot" 
sequences that use three dots instead of two (/.../) to traverse 
directories and view or download any file outside of the Web root 
directory. [xforce2] 
 
Although developed by the same company, these two products are 
marketed separately. 
At the time of this writing it was unclear if Network Associates Incorporated 
was notified about this vulnerability in their enterprise level virus protection 
product. 
 
4.2.2.  Spring 2004 and Spring 2002 comparison 
 
To compensate for the Spring 2004 semester partial scan, the number of 
vulnerabilities per port was adjusted by a common multiplier (hosts scanned 
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 during Spring 2002 / hosts scanned during Spring 2004) to estimate the total 
number of detectable vulnerabilities. 
 
Table 6.  Percent change in critical vulnerabilities, Spring 2002 and Spring 2004. 
 
 
 
port Spring 2002 
 Spring 
2004 
Spring 2004 
adjusted 
(x4.309) 
difference 
(adjusted) 
% change 
(adjusted) 
all 9311 3159 13613 4302 46.2 
445 0 687 2960 2960 N/A 
8083 0 506 2180 2180 N/A 
135 0 325 1400 1400 N/A 
80 202 178 767 565 279.7 
161 1218 118 508 -710 -58.3 
21 193 96 414 221 114.3 
139 7042 35 151 -6891 -97.9 
631 26 29 125 99 380.6 
443 44 26 112 68 154.6 
25 128 24 103 -25 -19.2 
280 18 21 90 72 402.7 
22 7 17 73 66 946.5 
3339 0 17 73 73 N/A 
5225 0 14 60 60 N/A 
6112 8 13 56 48 600.2 
 
The number of vulnerabilities increased 46.2% between the time period of 
Spring 2002 and Spring 2004.  The number of vulnerabilities during the Spring 2004 
scan was at a level similar to Fall 2001. 
 The order of the most vulnerable ports between the two scans changed 
significantly.  Port 139 was the most vulnerable port in the 2002 scan showing 
7,042 discovered abilities.  In the Spring 2004 scan, it ranked seventh, showing 
only 151 vulnerabilities.  The most vulnerable port during the most recent scan 
was port 445, which had a total of 2,960 vulnerabilities.  During the second scan, 
this port registered zero vulnerabilities.  This change can be attributed to a 
change in the SMB communications architecture starting in Windows 2000.  SMB 
is an acronym for ‘server message block’ and is described as “a message 
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 format used by DOS and Windows to share files, directories and devices” 
[Webopedia].  In versions of Windows previous to Windows 2000, SMB was 
partnered with the NetBIOS protocol for communication purposes.  This 
communication used TCP port 139.  Since Windows 2000, NetBIOS was no longer 
used to transmit SMB information; the server message blocks were transmitted 
using the TCP/IP protocol.  Nessus data indicated that only systems running the 
Windows 9x operating systems and some Linux systems, assumed to be running 
Samba, have vulnerabilities on port 135.  All machines that reported 
vulnerabilities on port 445 were either Windows 2000 professional or Windows XP. 
 Port 135, used by the Windows RPC end point mapper, was the third most 
vulnerable port during the Spring 2004 scan.  Remote Procedure Call is a 
protocol that supports the remote execution of code on a host system.  Port 135 
is consistently at the top of the most attacked ports, as reported by the Internet 
Storm Center, a service run by the SANS Institute that receives and analyzes logs 
from millions of intrusion detection systems.  The MS03-026 Microsoft security 
advisory warned of a buffer overflow in the RPC interface that could allow 
arbitrary code execution [MS03-026].  This vulnerability was exploited by the 
MSBlast worm.  It is theorized that the steadily decreasing level of port 135 
attacks from unique sources is related to the discovery and cleansing of this 
worm. 
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Figure 4.  Top attacked ports per day by number of distinct attack sources. 
(source: Internet Storm Center – http://www.incidents.org, January 30, 2004) 
 
Port 80 vulnerabilities increased by 279.7% from Spring 2002 to Spring 2004.  
The vulnerabilities were detected in systems running various Windows operating 
systems, Linux operating systems and print devices.  Sixty-two different 
vulnerabilities were discovered on the 89 machines that reported a port 80 
vulnerability.  The class C subnet that contains the main campus web servers 
was not scanned during this third scan, and therefore the 178 vulnerabilities 
Nessus discovered during the Spring 2004 scan were on systems running possible 
unauthorized services. 
SNMP information disclosure vulnerabilities dropped by 58.3% between the 
Spring 2002 and Spring 2004 scans.  FTP vulnerabilities increased 114.3% during 
the two year span. 
 The number of average critical vulnerabilities, warnings and informational 
discoveries per host found by Nessus increased between the Spring 2002 and 
Spring 2004 semesters.  The average number of critical vulnerabilities per host 
rose 46.1% from 2.377 average critical vulnerabilities to 3.475 average critical 
vulnerabilities.  The average number of warnings per host rose 46.1% from 6.682 
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 average warnings to 9.764 average warnings.  The average number of 
information discoveries per host rose 16.3% from 8.832 average informational 
discoveries to 10.273 average informational discoveries. 
 
Table 7.  Average vulnerabilities by type, Fall 2001, Spring 2002 and Spring 2004. 
 Fall 2001 Spring 2002 Spring 2004 Total 
critical 
vulnerabilities 13642 9311 3159 26112 
avg. critical / 
host 3.694 2.377 3.475 3.065 
warnings 
 18588 26176 8876 53640 
avg. warn. / 
host 5.033 6.682 9.764 6.043 
informational 
disclosure 30828 34597 9339 74764 
avg. info / 
host 8.347 8.832 10.273 8.776 
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 Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
5.1.  Conclusions 
 
Unpatched Windows operating system vulnerabilities are the top threat to 
security on the ETSU administrative network.  Port 139 critical vulnerabilities 
accounted for 80.1% of all critical vulnerabilities discovered during the initial two 
scans.  The major problem facing campus security is the absence of a patch 
management and deployment system for the over 3,000 Windows based 
computer systems.  Under the current security model, users are responsible for 
applying operating system and application patches to their workstation.  
Attempts for the Office of Information Technology to automate patch 
distribution to workstations have been squelched by members of the faculty 
community.  Concerns exist that automated patch installation may disable 
specialized programs that are installed and used on faculty workstations. 
 Allowing ‘academic freedom’ grants liberties to workstation users at ETSU 
that do not follow preferred security guidelines.  Users are made a local 
administrator on their primary workstation and may install any program, or run 
any executable.  Users commonly make unwise choices such as installing 
programs laced with spyware or running unknown executables received 
through e-mail.  The network is also open to anyone with access to a network 
jack, and systems that are not members of the ETSU domain can receive an IP 
address and access ETSU resources and the Internet.  The ETSU firewall protects 
against exploits by outside sources, but when an infected source enters the ETSU 
network, the probability that the network could suffer a large number of 
compromises increases. 
 In some cases, server class operating systems are installed on workstations 
and server class hardware not administered by the Office of Information 
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 Technology.  On April 2, 2002, a Windows NT server was compromised and 
turned into a web server of pornographic material.  The intruders were able to 
compromise this Windows NT Server because the administrator password was 
left blank.  On April 4, 2002, a Windows 2000 machine was compromised and 
turned into a ‘warez’ server holding applications, games and pornographic 
movies.  The administrator password on this machine was also left blank.  On 
April 14, 2002, a machine was used as a mail server to send out e-mails 
advertising pornography.  The network readable SMTP service allowed 
anonymous relaying of e-mail and was used by the intruders to send over 23,000 
solicitations.  The machine was configured to offload the duty of sending the 
mail to the former ETSU mail server, access.etsu.edu.  Under the unusual load of 
outgoing e-mail, and the 13,000 solicitations that were ‘bounced back,’ access 
folded and denied service to ETSU faculty, staff and students. 
Systems such as ats.etsu.edu, mentioned in Section 4.1.1.1, and the three 
systems mentioned here illustrate how allowing university employees to 
administer their workstations or servers has decreased the security on the ETSU 
administrative network.  Changing this policy of open administration would be 
difficult and may not be desired in an educational environment.  Security 
policies set by an information technology department, foremost, should not 
interfere with this educational mission.  However, until security policies are 
developed and enforced, it is theorized that the number of vulnerabilities will 
remain consistent with the data discovered in this study. 
Continued security audits at ETSU would not be practical until a system for 
patch deployment was implemented.  The analysis found most of the critical 
vulnerabilities (>75%) were related to Windows operating systems being 
unpatched or misconfigured.  Without a patch deployment system to create a 
security baseline, an audit would only discover the obvious; that operating 
system patches were missing on many systems. 
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 5.2.  Avenues for Research 
 
5.2.1.  ETSU Domain Password Policy 
 
East Tennessee State University does not enforce a strict password policy 
on the ETSU Windows 2000 Active Directory Domain.  The current policy allows 
for any password that is at least six characters in length and may consist of any 
combinations of letters, numbers or symbols.  A user’s password must be 
changed once every ninety days, and the same password can not be used 
twice in succession.  A possible extension of this thesis would involve using the 
LC4 program described in the following section to analyze the passwords used 
on the ETSU domain to determine the exploitability or ‘crackability’ or these 
passwords.  From this information, it could be determined if a stricter password 
policy for the domain should be suggested. 
 
5.2.1.1  LC4 
 
LC4 is a Windows-based utility that evaluates the strength of Windows user 
account passwords.  Password strength is determined by the time it takes a third 
party to guess or decipher a user password.  A password easy for an attacker to 
guess or decipher increases network vulnerability.  Weak passwords are 
generally common words, names of people or pets, birthdays, and passwords six 
characters or less in length.  Strong passwords are generally eight characters or 
longer in length, and contain a combination of letters, numbers and symbols.  
LC4 can only decipher passwords used in Windows NT/2000 network 
environments [LC4]. 
 LC4 first must gather the encrypted passwords before the (sometimes 
long) deciphering process.  LC4 can retrieve encrypted passwords in from a 
local registry; from a remote registry; from a SAM file; and through sniffing.  
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 Administrative rights are required for many encrypted password retrieval tasks, 
for obvious security reasons. 
 LC4 can ‘dump’ passwords from the local machine registry.  LC4 will not 
retrieve locally stored password hashes if a non-privileged user makes the 
‘dump’ request. 
 Encrypted passwords may also be retrieved from a remote computer 
registry.  The user requesting the retrieval must have administrative rights on the 
host machine.  To retrieve remote password hashes, the host machine must 
allow remote registry access also.  If the remote machine protects the 
encrypted passwords with Microsoft SYSKEY (Windows NT 4.0 SP3 and later), a 
utility exists that can be used to bypass SYSKEY encryption and retrieve the 
encrypted passwords for use by LC4 [LC4]. 
 Passwords can be retrieved from a ‘SAM file.’  The SAM file is a database 
of encrypted passwords held by the Security Account Manager of Windows NT 
based systems [Microsoft3].  A SAM file can only be retrieved in specific ways 
since the Security Account Manager holds a lock on the SAM file.  The first way 
to retrieve a SAM file involves booting the system from a floppy disk that 
contains DOS or a DOS-based version of Windows.  On this boot disk, a utility to 
view NTFS partitions under DOS must exist.  The SAM file may be copied since the 
SAM file is not locked in DOS.  Second, Windows NT 4 systems store the SAM file 
on repair disks and the WINNT\repair directory.  The SAM file, lastly, can be 
recovered from a backup tape [LC4]. 
 The final method of password retrieval is ‘sniffing’ and collecting network 
packets that contain encrypted passwords.  Sniffing network packets with LC4 
requires a packet capture driver to be installed.  A computer on an unswitched 
network will receive packets destined for all systems attached to a common 
hub, section of network or broadcast domain.  The network interface device 
normally discards packets destined for other machines.  A packet capture driver 
accepts all packets received by the network interface device [LC4]. 
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 LC4 attempts to decipher a password using a four phase algorithm [LC4]: 
 
• Test the password for equality with the username. 
• Test the password against common words or alphanumeric combinations.  
The newest release of LC4 contains a smaller dictionary of approximately 
twenty-five thousand words and a larger dictionary of approximately two-
hundred fifty thousand words. 
• Test the password against combinations of dictionary words with different 
combinations of numeric and symbolic characters.  The default setting 
appends two non-alphabetic characters to the end of each dictionary 
word.  The ‘hybrid’ phase deciphers such passwords as ‘apple50’ and 
‘secret!!’. 
• Attempt a brute force attempt of all character combinations.  The brute 
force phase of decryption will take the longest, in some cases in excess of 
twenty-four or forty-eight hours. 
 
Password strength can be measured by the time needed to decipher a 
password.  LC4 lists the audit time for each deciphered password.  If desired, the 
deciphered password may remain hidden [LC4]. 
Windows NT passwords can be brute-forced by LC4 in two pieces.  
Windows NT has a password character-length limit of fourteen characters.  The 
encryption methods employed by Windows NT allow the password to be 
decrypted in two seven-character segments.  Decrypting two seven-character 
password fragments is far faster than decrypting one fourteen-character 
password.  Windows 2000 sets no limit on password length.  Passwords fifteen 
characters or longer must be deciphered in full [LC4]. 
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Figure 5.  LC4 (not reporting cracked password). 
 
LC4 could be used to determine the average strength of ETSU user 
passwords.  With the absence of a password policy, a large percentage of user 
passwords (30%) are expected to be deciphered in the first three deciphering 
phases. 
 
5.2.2.  Software Update Services 
 
East Tennessee State University does not use a software package for the 
automated delivery of system patches to Windows workstations and servers on 
the ETSU administrative network.  One such software package for delivering 
system patches is Microsoft Software Update Services. Software Update Services 
(SUS) is a tool that allows domain administrators to control the ‘Automatic 
64 
 Updates’ control panel object of Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows 
Server 2003 systems on their domain. 
 A Software Update Services server is deployed on a site to be used as the 
repository for all workstations and servers use to receive critical updates.  The 
critical updates are cached locally on the SUS server through a synchronization 
process with windowsupdate.microsoft.com.  Once the update is downloaded 
and accepted for distribution by the administrator, the ‘Automatic Updates’ 
object within the client operating system is directed to process the update 
through the SUS server. 
 An active directory group policy controls how the Automatic Updates 
client processes updates.  SUS supports for three options for managing updates. 
The first option notifies the user of a patch’s availability and requires user 
intervention to both download the update from the SUS server and to install the 
patch.  The second option downloads the patch automatically to the client 
system, but will not attempt to install it without user intervention.  The third choice 
forces the Automatic Updates client to automatically download and install the 
update.  If the final choice is chosen, the administrator chooses the time at 
which the patch installation occurs.  Supplementary options exist that allow for 
an administrator to handle situations where a system was powered down during 
a scheduled installation time, and situations where a user is interactively logged 
into a machine during a scheduled installation time. 
 Currently, a Software Update Services server is being tested at ETSU for use 
on the administrative network.  However, global use of the server has been 
denied by committees that are concerned about the automatic patching of 
systems causing changes that could disable certain software packages.  An 
extension of this thesis could involve studying the risks and rewards of 
automatically patching system software on an enterprise level. 
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 5.2.3.  Systems Management Server 
 
Microsoft Systems Management Server allows administration of an entire 
network from a centralized point.  Deploying updates, new software, and on-site 
troubleshooting can be costly, in terms of money and labor, especially with a 
large number of systems.  Rolling out a new software program normally involves 
a privileged user visiting each system and manually installing the software 
package, or allowing the user of the system to have administrative access over 
their system.  Deploying a system-wide software update, such as a service pack, 
involves similar labor.  Systems Management Server allows administrators to 
deploy software and updates without visiting each system [Microsoft2]. 
 Systems Management Server maintains an inventory of hardware devices 
in a SQL database.  Knowledge of hardware devices helps to develop plans to 
upgrade software and hardware for older machines.  Hardware inventory aids 
troubleshooting cases where certain devices with known ‘problem’ software 
can be updated to a newer and less problematic software package.  Systems 
Management Server can eliminate human error in inventory upkeep.  Using SQL, 
administrators can query the hardware device database for desired hardware 
characteristics [Microsoft2]. 
 Systems Management Server maintains an inventory of software 
programs.  It is possible to query a listing of software packages installed on a 
system, or a listing of all systems with a specific software package installed.  
When the number of software licenses for an application is limited, Systems 
Management Server can detect the number of loaned licenses and block users 
from exceeding the license limit [Microsoft2]. 
 Administrators can control clients remotely using SMS remote desktop 
abilities to determine, and remedy problems encountered by a user.  Systems 
Management Server allows for full or partial control of a remote client 
[Microsoft2]. 
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 5.2.3.1.  Inventory 
 
Systems Management Server gathers data about network resources 
during ‘discovery’ events.  First, Systems Management Server gathers information 
about a computer system when the system is added to an SMS ‘site.’  A ‘site’ in 
SMS can refer to any logical partitioning of resources, including an entire 
enterprise or a single subnet.  Second, SMS can gather information from a DHCP 
server to discover systems that are not present on the network at a given time.  
Third, different logon methods into Novell NetWare systems can trigger Systems 
Management Server to gather information.  Finally, SMS periodically checks 
known resources for updates.  SMS polls computer systems that do not regularly 
activate conventional discovery triggers, such as systems that are infrequently 
rebooted, to keep its information about these resources current [Microsoft2]. 
 After a resource is discovered, the Systems Management Server client is 
automatically installed on the newly discovered resource.  The SMS client 
software then collects resource data collection and transfers it to the Systems 
Management Server upon request.   The software tracks data on more than 200 
different attributes of each resource system.  Client attributes tracked are 
reminiscent of data listed by the Windows Device Manager and Windows 
System Information.  The Windows Device Manager lists hardware devices, such 
as drives, video and network adapters, disk controllers, ports and other 
peripherals.  Microsoft System Information lists hardware device attributes like 
processor speed, amount of memory, operating system, and computer 
manufacturer, as well as hardware resources, such as memory address and 
interrupt requests. 
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Figure 6.  Microsoft System Information MMC snap-in 
 
If a system’s hardware configuration is changed, only changes and not 
the complete hardware inventory are transmitted to the Systems Management 
Server.  Transmitting only changes saves bandwidth on slower connections and 
reduces overhead on the Systems Management Server.  The SMS client installed 
on each resource system collects the amendment data [Microsoft2]. 
 The SMS client performs a software inventory in a similar manner to a 
hardware inventory.  The client searches the system for installed software and 
transmits the compiled list to the Systems Management Server [Microsoft2]. 
 In addition to cataloguing software applications installed on each 
resource system, Systems Management Server can restrict access to certain 
applications based on user, time and usage.  For example, an administrator can 
block access to Solitaire on all systems during normal business hours.  Also, 
administrators can also deny access to certain applications with limited licenses.  
A user wishing to use an application with all available licenses loaned enters a 
line for a ‘callback’ when a license becomes free for use.  Mobile users can also 
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 check out a license for the use of a program on a laptop computer so the 
mobile user can execute the problem disconnected from the network without 
exceeding available software licenses [Microsoft2]. 
 
5.2.3.2.  Deployment 
 
Deployment of a single application or application update over a network 
of hundreds or thousands of systems is time consuming and very costly.  Systems 
Management Server can ease a ‘rollout’ of an application or an update over a 
network by eliminating the ‘footwork’ involved in a classic rollout.  The Systems 
Management Server first alerts each SMS client of an applicable update.  After 
acceptance by the user, the SMS client then installs the update.  Systems 
Management Server can install single files, applications or operating systems 
[Microsoft2]. 
 Through the SMS Software Inventory, an administrator can assess systems 
in need of certain updates.  Updates can be advertised to single or multiple 
users, to a network segment, or to a specific machine.  Once a user receives an 
advertisement from the SMS client, that user can choose to install the software 
immediately or schedule an unattended install.  Conventionally, an 
administrator would need to visit each computer, log in as a privileged user and 
install the software manually.  The SMS client acts as a system administrator, so 
any user can install advertised software, regardless of privilege. 
 To prepare a software update for SMS distribution, an administrator 
creates a script to automate the installation process on the client system.  The 
administrator must create a ‘package’ that details the software information and 
location for distribution on the network.  Multiple distribution points can be 
created to alleviate a bottleneck at one server hosting an update for an entire 
network.  Once the application is hosted on the appropriate distribution points, 
and the script and package are created, the administrator may advertise the 
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 new application to a single user/machine or multiple users/machines.  The SMS 
client on each appropriate machine then alerts the user that new software is 
available for installation [Microsoft2]. 
 Programs may be automatically uninstalled from client machines by SMS.  
When a program is no longer needed or when an unattended installation fails, 
programs can be uninstalled by the SMS client.  Administrators can reduce 
installation-scripting errors by using the SMS ‘dry-run’ function.  An application 
package can be test-installed to determine the integrity of the installation script 
and application files [Microsoft2]. 
 
5.2.3.3.  Diagnostics and Troubleshooting 
 
Application and hardware problems can be diagnosed remotely using 
Systems Management Server.  An administrator can take full control over the 
client computer, send files when needed or chat with the user to gather more 
information about a problem with the client computer. 
 Remote control allows an administrator to view a client system remotely 
and issue commands to the client via mouse or keyboard.  The remote control 
functionality is only accessible to individuals with administrative rights 
[Microsoft2]. 
 Administrators can also reboot a remote machine to finish a software 
update, or to revive a system that has failed.  Administrators can also execute 
programs remotely.  Using all these features of SMS, an administrator can send 
an update in executable form to a client computer, execute the update and 
then reboot the machine to finish the installation process [Microsoft2]. 
 In addition to monitoring the health of a single system, SMS permits 
administrators to monitor their network’s health.  Potential network trouble 
includes broken links and bottlenecks.  A network can be mapped and 
graphically displayed for the administrator.  The mapping can show systems 
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 within a subnet and how subnets connect to form a compete network.  
Mapping information can be used to find bottlenecks in traffic patterns or 
software distribution paths. 
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 Appendix A 
Terms and Definitions 
 
some definitions adapted from http://www.webopedia.com 
Term or 
abbreviation Definition 
ACK 
ACKnowledge – A type of TCP/IP packet sent to 
acknowledge the host and client are attempting to create a 
connection. 
bootpc A utility that allows a client to receive network information from a bootp server. 
bootps A service that allows clients to network boot using a bootp server. 
chargen A UNIX utility that sends random characters over a network. 
CGI 
Common Gateway Interface – A specification that allows a 
server-side executable to accept and manipulate data given 
from a web page. 
COPS 
Computer Oracle and Password System - A freeware UNIX 
tool that discovers computer system misconfigurations that 
pose a risk to system and network security. 
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check – a technique for determining transmission errors. 
DDoS 
Distributed Denial of Service (attack) – an attack launched by 
multiple computers against a host that blocks a large 
percentage of legitimate network traffic from entering the 
host network or system. 
DHCP 
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol – a protocol used for 
automatically assigning dynamic IP addresses to network 
clients. 
DoS 
Denial of Service – an attack launched by a single computer 
against a host that causes a failure in the host that denies 
services. 
DOS 
Disk Operating System – a computer operating system 
developed by Microsoft prevalent in many computers for 
over a decade. 
echo A utility used to display a line of text on a screen. 
ETSU East Tennessee State University - a regional university located in Johnson City, Tennessee. 
exec A UNIX command that executes applications. 
FIN FINish – a type of TCP/IP packet sent to terminate the connection between a host and a client. 
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 finger A utility used to retrieve information about a remote user. 
FTP File Transfer Protocol – a protocol used for transferring files across the Internet. 
gopher A system of organizing information for remote browsing that predates the World Wide Web. 
HTTP 
HyperText Transfer Protocol – The protocol used by the World 
Wide Web for transferring data between web servers and 
web browsers. 
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol – A protocol used for transmitting error, control and informational messages. 
IDS 
Intrusion Detection System – a system, normally placed at the 
entrance of a network, that examines network traffic and logs 
packets sent with possible malicious intent. 
IP 
Internet Protocol – a connectionless protocol used to deliver 
packets of information between two, or more, systems on a 
network. Paired with the Transport Control Protocol to create 
TCP/IP, the main protocol used on the Internet and local area 
networks. 
klogin A utility used to remotely login to a UNIX machine 
kshell A utility used to remotely open a Kerberos remote shell 
LC4 A Windows tool that audits password strength of Windows user accounts. 
login A UNIX command used to sign onto a system. 
mask-request A remote request for a network mask. 
Nessus A freeware UNIX tool that scans systems on a network to discover “well-known” security vulnerabilities. 
NIS 
Network Information Service/Server – A server that 
continuously browses a network to discover services and lists 
network services for lookup. 
Nmap A freeware UNIX tool that determines open ports within a network protocol stack. 
NTFS 
New Technology File System – A file system used by Windows 
NT machines that increases reliability and security when 
compared to FAT. 
OSPF 
Open Shortest Path First – a routing protocol that offers a more 
efficient method of router intercommunication than the 
Routing Information Protocol. 
PUSH A type of TCP/IP packet that prioritizes the packet. 
RFC Request For Comments – Documents submitted to be considered for Internet standards. 
RIP Routing Information Protocol – a protocol used by routers to exchange internet topography information between routers 
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 RPC Remote Procedure Call – a protocol that allows a client to execute a program on a host 
RST ReSeT – a type of TCP/IP packet that resets the connection between a client and host. 
SATAN Security Administrator Tool for Analyzing Networks – the first well-known, network security scanner. 
SMB Server Message Block – a message format used by DOS and Windows to share files, directories and devices. 
SMS Systems Management Server – An application developed by Microsoft for administering a network from a centralized point. 
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol – a protocol used for sending e-mail messages between e-mail servers 
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol – a protocol used for managing networks.  Mainly for remote system diagnostics. 
Snort A freeware cross-platform “lightweight intrustion detection system” 
SQL Structured Query Language – A language for database data manipulation. 
SYN SYNchronize – A type of TCP/IP packet that synchronizes a data stream between a client and host. 
talk A UNIX program used to communicate between two 
TCP 
Transport Control Protocol – a connection-based protocol 
that enables two system to communicate with streams of 
information.  Paired with the Internet Protocol to create 
TCP/IP, the main protocol used on the Internet and local area 
networks. 
telnet 
A program/protocol used to connect and interact with a 
remote host to perform operations as if the remote host were 
local. 
TFTP 
Trivial File Transfer Protocol – A FTP service without security 
features that uses the UDP protocol to transfer files between 
systems. 
timestamp-
request A remote request for a timestamp. 
traceroute A utility that tracks a packet between the client and receiving host, noting all intermediate systems traversed. 
UDP User Datagram Protocol – a connectionless protocol used mainly in broadcast delivery of packets. 
UNIX A computer operating system with many variants built for multi-user, multi-process operation. 
URG URGent – a type of TCP/IP packet that flags the packet as containing urgent data. 
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 who A UNIX program used to list users currently signed into a system. 
whois A utility used to find information about a domain name or an IP address. 
xdmcp X Display Manager Control Protocol – used by X terminals to set up an X session with a remote system. 
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 Appendix B 
nsrparser source code 
 
// --- main.cpp --- 
// 
// purpose : this program parses a Nessus .nsr file (or a cat of multiple 
//    .nsr files) to return desired statistics.  hex edit and remove 
//    all 1A entries from files before using. 
//  
// ---------------- 
 
// declarations 
#pragma warning(disable:4786) 
#include <algorithm>      // vector sorting 
#include <fstream>      // file streaming 
#include <iostream>      // user input and screen output streams 
#include <string>       // string container 
#include <vector>      // vector container 
using namespace std; 
 
// struct declarations 
struct SELECTION // a single line of a .nsr file separated into its pieces 
{ 
 
 string   strHost;    // host name/ip 
 string   strPort;    // port number 
 string   strPlugin;    // plugin number 
 string   strSeverity;   // warning type 
 string   strDescription;   // vulnerability description 
 
}; 
 
struct PLUGDESC // plugin number and associated description 
{ 
 
 string   strPlugin;    // plugin number 
 string   strDescription;   // vulnerability description 
 
}; 
 
struct OPERSYS // operating system information gathered from scan 
{ 
 
 string   strHost;    // host name/ip 
 string   strnmap;    // nmap findings 
 string   strQueso;   // queso findings 
 string   strOS;    // host OS (inferred) 
 
}; 
 
struct HOST // host names 
{ 
 
 string   strHost;    // host name/ip 
 
}; 
 
 
struct PORTSEV // an open port and its associated occurrences of notes, info and report flags 
{ 
 
 string   strPort;    // port number 
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  int   nNOTE;    // number of information entries 
 int   nINFO;    // number of warning entries 
 int   nREPORT;   // number of vulnerability entries 
 
}; 
 
//variable declarations 
 fstream   fstrIn;    // default incoming stream 
 fstream   fstrOut;    // default outgoing stream 
 SELECTION*  SELCurrent;   // pointer for NEW SELECTION creation 
 vector<HOST>*  pvecHosts;   // pointer for NEW vector<HOST> creation 
 vector<OPERSYS>  vecOS;    // operating system information vector 
 vector<PORTSEV>* pvecSEV;   // pointer for NEW vector<PORTSEV> creation 
 vector<PLUGDESC> vecPLUGDESC;   // plugins and associated descriptions vector 
 vector<PLUGDESC>* pvecPLG;   // pointer for NEW vector<PLUGDESC> 
creation 
 vector<SELECTION> vecMainData;   // main data vector of SELECTIONS 
 
//function declarations 
 void   findDescription(string);  // finds a part of a description 
 void   findDescription2(string, string); 
        // finds a part of a description 
 void   findHoles(string);  
        // finds holes on a specified port 
 void   findPlugin(string, string);  // finds hosts with specific information 
 void   makeSelection(string&);   // make selection struct from NSR line 
 string   parseString(string&);  // retrieves information from NSR line 
 void   retrieveData();   // opens and parses file, filling vecMainData 
 void   openPorts(string);   // counts number of host with a port open 
 void   operatingSystems();  // find operating systems for hosts 
 void   outputPlugin();   // outputs list of plugins found to file 
 void   portInfo();   // returns port information 
 void   portVulnerabilities(string, string); // finds all vulnerabilities listed for a port 
 string   removeSemicolons(string);  // removes semicolons from plugin description 
 string   returnOS(string); 
 void   mainMenu();   // offers user parsing options 
 void   uniqueHosts();   // counts unique hosts 
 bool   vecsort(PORTSEV, PORTSEV); 
 
// --- main() --- 
// 
// -------------- 
void main() 
{ 
 
 cout << ".nsr parser v0.50" << endl; 
 
// load information 
 retrieveData(); 
 
// manipulate information 
 mainMenu(); 
 
 cout << "[quit]" << endl; 
 
} // end main 
 
// --- retrieveData() --- 
// 
// called by : main 
// calls to : makeSelection, operatingSystems 
// purpose : opens a file in .nsr format and parses the file, filling vecMainData, 
//    a vector of SELECTION objects. 
// 
// ------------------- 
void retrieveData() 
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 { 
 
 bool    bBadFile = true;  // bad filename flag 
 bool    bFoundValue = false; // item found in vector flag 
 char    cDelimiter = 10;  // delimiter for .nsr SELECTION information 
 PLUGDESC*   PTemp;   // pointer for NEW PLUGDESC creation 
 string    strFileName = "",  // name of file to parse 
     strLine = "",  // a single line of the data file 
     strTemp = "";  // string container for temporary information 
 vector<PLUGDESC>::reverse_iterator   iPLG;  // vecPLUGDESC iterator 
 vector<SELECTION>::iterator iSEL;   // vecMainData iterator 
  
 do 
 { 
// get filename to be used in processing 
  cout << "[enter name of data file]: "; 
  cin >> strFileName; 
  cin.ignore(80, '\n'); 
   
// attempt to open the file, ask again on error, continue until acceptable 
  fstrIn.open(strFileName.c_str()); 
  bBadFile = fstrIn.fail(); 
  if (bBadFile) 
  { 
   cout << "!! error - can not find file " << strFileName << endl; 
   fstrIn.clear(); 
  } 
 } while (bBadFile);  
 
// get a line of text, and process each line using the hex 0A delimiter 
 cout << "[processing main data vector] "; 
 
 do 
 { 
  getline(fstrIn, strLine, cDelimiter); 
  makeSelection(strLine); 
 } while (!fstrIn.eof()); 
 
 cout << " [done @ " << vecMainData.size() << " Nessus entries]" << endl; 
 
// close the file 
 fstrIn.close(); 
 
// create vector of plugin numbers and associated descriptions 
 cout << "[processing plugin/description vector] "; 
 
 for (iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++) 
 { 
  strTemp = (*iSEL).strPlugin; 
 
  for (iPLG = vecPLUGDESC.rbegin(); 
    iPLG != vecPLUGDESC.rend() && bFoundValue == false; 
    iPLG++) 
  { 
   if (strTemp == (*iPLG).strPlugin) 
   { 
    bFoundValue = true; 
   } 
  } 
 
// if value is not found in host vector, add hostname to host vector 
  if (bFoundValue == false) 
  { 
   PTemp = new PLUGDESC; 
   (*PTemp).strPlugin = (*iSEL).strPlugin; 
   (*PTemp).strDescription = (*iSEL).strDescription; 
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    vecPLUGDESC.push_back(*PTemp); 
   delete PTemp; 
  } 
 
// reset bFoundValue 
  bFoundValue = false; 
 } 
 
 cout << " [done @ " << vecPLUGDESC.size() << " Nessus plugins]" << endl; 
 
// fill operating systems vector 
 cout << "[processing operating system information] "; 
 
 operatingSystems(); 
 
 cout << " [done @ " << vecOS.size() << " OS inferences]" << endl; 
 
} // retrieveData() 
 
// --- makeSelection() --- 
// 
// called by: retrieveData 
// calls to: parseString 
// inputs: strLine - a single line from the data file 
// purpose: fill a SELECTION object from a line of the data file 
// 
// ----------------------- 
void makeSelection(string& strLine) 
{ 
 
// create a NEW SELECTION 
 SELCurrent = new SELECTION; 
 
// get host name from first section of data file line 
 (*SELCurrent).strHost = parseString(strLine); 
  
// check for bogus host name/ip entries, else fill vector 
 if ((*SELCurrent).strHost == "<empty>") 
 { 
  delete SELCurrent; 
 } 
 else 
 { 
  (*SELCurrent).strPort = parseString(strLine); 
  (*SELCurrent).strPlugin = parseString(strLine); 
  (*SELCurrent).strSeverity = parseString(strLine); 
  (*SELCurrent).strDescription = removeSemicolons(parseString(strLine)); 
 
// add the nSelection to vecMainData and destroy SELCurrent 
  vecMainData.push_back(*SELCurrent); 
  delete SELCurrent; 
 } 
  
} //makeStruct() 
 
// --- parseString() --- 
// 
// called by: makeSelection 
// inputs: strLine - a single line from the data file 
// purpose: parses a single line of a .nsr file using the | delimiter 
// returns: portion of strLine or <empty> is line is empty 
// 
// --------------------- 
string parseString(string& strLine) 
{ 
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  int    nCol = 0;   // column of desired character 
 string    strReturn = "";  // string to return 
 
// return <empty> if the length of strLine = 0 
 if (strLine.length() == 0) 
  return ("<empty>"); 
 
// find first | in the line, and return the portion of the string before the delimiter 
// if no delimiter, return the entire string.  trim strLine to remove used portion 
 nCol = strLine.find_first_of("|"); 
 
 if (nCol != string::npos) 
 { 
  strReturn = strLine.substr(0,nCol); 
  strLine = strLine.substr(nCol+1, strLine.length() - nCol); 
 } 
 else 
 { 
  strReturn = strLine; 
  strLine = ""; 
 } 
 
 return strReturn; 
 
} // parseString() 
 
// --- removeSemicolons() --- 
// 
// called by: makeSelection 
// inputs: strLine - description returned from plugin 
// purpose: replaces ; from plugin descriptions with newline characters for easier output 
// returns: strTemp - the plugin description with replaced ; 
//  
// -------------------------- 
string removeSemicolons(string strLine) 
{ 
 
 int   nCol = 0;    // column of desired character 
 string   strTemp = "";   // string container for temporary information 
  
// if no ; exist, return 
 if (strLine.find_first_of(";") == string::npos) 
 { 
  return (strLine); 
 } 
 
// loop until no ; remain 
 do 
 { 
  nCol = strLine.find_first_of(";"); 
 
//change the next line to choose the ; replacement 
  strTemp = strTemp + strLine.substr(0, nCol) + "\n"; 
  strLine = strLine.substr(nCol+1, strLine.length() - nCol); 
 } while (strLine.find_first_of(";") != string::npos); 
 
 strTemp = strTemp + strLine; 
 
 return (strTemp); 
 
} // removeSemicolons() 
 
// --- operatingSystems() --- 
// 
// called by: retrieveData 
// purpose: infer operating system of host from information gathered during the scan 
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 // 
// -------------------------- 
void operatingSystems() 
{ 
 
 bool    bFoundValue = false; // host found in vector flag 
 
// operating system clues found in nmap and queso plugins 
 const char*   aix = "AIX"; 
 const char*   cisco = "Cisco"; 
 const char*   early = "NT4 / Win95 / Win98"; 
 const char*   early2 = "95/98/NT"; 
 const char*   hpux = "HP-UX"; 
 const char*   irix = "Irix"; 
 const char*   irix2 = "IRIX"; 
 const char*   linux = "Linux"; 
 const char*   ljet1 = "LaserJet"; 
 const char*   ljet2 = "JETdirect"; 
 const char*   ljet3 = "JetDirect"; 
 const char*   ltx = "Lantronix"; 
 const char*   mac = "Mac"; 
 const char*   me = "Me"; 
 const char*   me2 = "Millenium"; 
 const char*   nov = "Novell"; 
 const char*   nts = "NT 4.0 Server"; 
 const char*   sol = "Solaris"; 
 const char*   three1 = "3Com"; 
 const char*   three2 = "3COM"; 
 const char*   un = "UNIX"; 
 const char*   vms = "VMS"; 
 const char*   wnt = "WindowsNT"; 
 const char*   w2k = "Windows 2000"; 
 const char*   w2ks = "Advance Server"; 
 const char*   w31 = "3.11"; 
 const char*   xp = "XP"; 
 
 OPERSYS*   OTemp;   // pointer for NEW OPERSYS objects 
 string    strnmap = "", 
     strQueso = "",  // OS information findings 
     strTemp = "";  // string container for temporary information 
 string    NMAP_PLUGIN_NUMBER = "10336"; 
        // plugin number for nmap OS information 
 string    QUESO_PLUGIN_NUMBER = "10337"; 
        // plugin number for queso OS information 
 vector<OPERSYS>::reverse_iterator iOS;     // vecOS iterator 
 vector<SELECTION>::iterator   iSEL;    // vecMainData iterator 
 
// crawl main data vector for hostnames 
 for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++) 
 { 
   
// get plugin number 
  strTemp = (*iSEL).strPlugin; 
 
// compare plugin numbers 
  if ((strTemp == NMAP_PLUGIN_NUMBER) || (strTemp == QUESO_PLUGIN_NUMBER)) 
  { 
// check host vector for hostname found in vecMainData 
// reverse iterator chosen for "rule of proximity" 
   for(iOS = vecOS.rbegin(); 
    iOS != vecOS.rend() && bFoundValue == false; 
    iOS++) 
   { 
// if hostname is already listed in vecOS, add new data to vecOS 
    if ((*iSEL).strHost == (*iOS).strHost) 
    { 
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      bFoundValue = true; 
 
     if ((*iSEL).strPlugin == NMAP_PLUGIN_NUMBER) 
      (*iOS).strnmap = (*iSEL).strDescription; 
     else  
      (*iOS).strQueso = (*iSEL).strDescription; 
    } 
   } 
 
// if value is not found in host vector, add hostname to host vector 
   if (bFoundValue == false) 
   { 
    OTemp = new OPERSYS; 
    (*OTemp).strHost = (*iSEL).strHost; 
    (*OTemp).strnmap = "<empty>"; 
    (*OTemp).strQueso = "<empty>"; 
    (*OTemp).strOS = "<no information>"; 
 
    if ((*iSEL).strPlugin == NMAP_PLUGIN_NUMBER) 
     (*OTemp).strnmap = (*iSEL).strDescription; 
    else  
     (*OTemp).strQueso = (*iSEL).strDescription; 
 
    (vecOS).push_back(*OTemp); 
    delete OTemp; 
   } 
 
// reset bFoundValue 
   bFoundValue = false; 
  } 
 } 
 
// attempt to determine OS from nmap and queso findings and update vecOS 
 for (iOS = vecOS.rbegin(); iOS != vecOS.rend(); iOS++) 
 { 
   
  strnmap = (*iOS).strnmap; 
  strQueso = (*iOS).strQueso; 
 
  if ((strnmap.find(sol) != string::npos) && (strQueso.find(sol) != string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "Solaris";  
  else if ((strnmap.find(w2ks) != string::npos) && (strQueso.find(wnt) != string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "Windows 2000 Server"; 
  else if ((strnmap.find(w2k) != string::npos) && (strQueso.find(wnt) != string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "Windows 2000 Professional";  
  else if ((strnmap.find(nts) != string::npos) && (strQueso.find(wnt) != string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "Windows NT4 Server";  
  else if ((strnmap.find(early) != string::npos) && (strQueso.find(wnt) != string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "Windows NT4 Workstation";  
  else if ((strnmap.find(early) != string::npos) && (strQueso.find(early2) != string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "Windows 95 or 98";  
  else if ((strnmap.find(cisco) != string::npos) && (strQueso.find(cisco) != string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "Cisco IOS";  
  else if (strnmap.find(me2) != string::npos) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "Windows Millennium Edition";  
  else if (strnmap.find(w31) != string::npos)  
   (*iOS).strOS = "Windows for Workgroups v3.11";  
  else if ((strnmap.find(ljet1) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(ljet2) != string::npos) || (strnmap.find(ljet3) 
!= string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "HP JetDirect Printer";  
  else if ((strnmap.find(xp) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(xp) != string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "Windows XP";  
  else if ((strnmap.find(nov) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(nov) != string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "Novell Netware";  
  else if ((strnmap.find(three1) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(three2) != string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "3Com Device";  
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   else if ((strnmap.find(hpux) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(hpux) != string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "HP-UX";  
  else if ((strnmap.find(linux) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(linux) != string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "Linux";  
  else if ((strnmap.find(irix) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(irix2) != string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "Irix";  
  else if ((strnmap.find(aix) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(aix) != string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "AIX";  
  else if ((strnmap.find(vms) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(vms) != string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "VMS";  
  else if ((strnmap.find(mac) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(mac) != string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "MacOS";  
  else if ((strnmap.find(un) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(un) != string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "[?]UNIX";  
  else if ((strnmap.find(w2k) != string::npos) && (strnmap.find(me) != string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "[?]Windows 2000 Professional";  
  else if (strnmap.find(w2ks) != string::npos) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "[?]Windows 2000 Server";  
  else if (strnmap.find(nts) != string::npos) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "[?]Windows NT4 Server";  
  else if (strQueso.find(wnt) != string::npos) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "[?]Windows NT4 Workstation / Server / Cisco IOS";  
  else if ((strnmap.find(early) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(early2) != string::npos) || 
(strnmap.find(early2) != string::npos)) 
   (*iOS).strOS = "[?]Windows 95 / 98 / NT4";  
  else 
  { 
   (*iOS).strOS = "<unknown>"; 
  } 
 } 
} // operatingSystems() 
 
// --- mainMenu() --- 
// 
// called by: main 
// purpose: main menu for program.  switch on users choice. 
// 
// ------------------ 
void mainMenu() 
{ 
 
 bool   bGoodValue = false;  // acceptable menu selection flag 
 char   YN = 'n';    // yes/no answer 
 int   nSelection;   // menu choice of user 
 string   strInfo;    // user given information 
 string   strInfo2;    // user given information 
 vector<PLUGDESC>::iterator iPLG;    // vecPLUGDESC iterator 
 
// loop until quit 
 do 
 { 
//loop until acceptable choice 
  do 
  { 
// reset yes/no flag 
   YN = 'n'; 
    
   cout << endl << "[main menu]" << endl << endl; 
   cout << "     [ 1] hosts by name" << endl; 
   cout << "     [ 2] hosts by single port" << endl; 
   cout << "     [ 3] hosts by single vulnerability" << endl; 
   cout << "     [ 4] hosts by single port vulnerabilities" << endl; 
   cout << "     [ 5] ports by # vulnerabilities" << endl; 
   cout << "     [ 6] vulnerabilities by single port" << endl; 
   cout << "     [ 7] hosts by description" << endl; 
   cout << "     [ 8] hosts by two descriptions" << endl; 
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    cout << "     [ 9] warnings by single port" << endl; 
   cout << "     [10] notes by single port" << endl; 
   cout << "     [11] hosts by single warning" << endl; 
   cout << "     [12] hosts by single note" << endl; 
   cout << "     [97] output plugin information to file" << endl; 
   cout << "     [98] change information file" << endl; 
   cout << "     [99] quit" << endl; 
   cout << endl << "     [1-10, 98, 99]: "; 
   cin >> nSelection; 
   cin.ignore(80, '\n'); 
 
   if (((nSelection >= 1) && (nSelection <= 12)) || ((nSelection >= 97) && (nSelection <= 99))) 
    bGoodValue = true; 
 
   if (bGoodValue == false) 
    cout << endl << "!! error - invalid menu choice" << endl << endl; 
 
  } while (bGoodValue == false); 
 
  switch(nSelection) 
  { 
 
   case 1: 
    uniqueHosts(); 
    break; 
 
   case 2: 
    cout << endl << "[enter port number to search for] : "; 
    cin >> strInfo; 
    cin.ignore(80, '\n'); 
    cout << endl; 
 
    openPorts(strInfo); 
    break; 
 
   case 3: 
    cout << endl << "[enter plugin number to search for] : "; 
    cin >> strInfo; 
    cin.ignore(80, '\n'); 
    cout << endl; 
 
    for (iPLG = vecPLUGDESC.begin(); iPLG != vecPLUGDESC.end(); iPLG++) 
    { 
 
     if ((*iPLG).strPlugin == strInfo) 
     { 
      cout << endl << (*iPLG).strDescription << endl; 
      cout << endl << "[find this information/vulnerability (y/n)] : "; 
      cin >> YN; 
      cout << endl; 
      cin.ignore(80, '\n'); 
       
      if (YN == 'y') 
      { 
       findPlugin(strInfo, "REPORT"); 
       break; 
      } 
      else 
      { 
       cout << endl <<"!! error - user intervention" << endl; 
       break; 
      } 
 
     } 
 
     if (YN == 'y') 
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       break; 
 
    } 
 
    if (YN == 'y') 
     break; 
 
    cout << "!! error - plugin not found" << endl << endl; 
    break; 
 
   case 4: 
    cout << endl << "[enter port number to search for] : "; 
    cin >> strInfo; 
    cin.ignore(80, '\n'); 
    cout << endl; 
 
    findHoles(strInfo); 
    break; 
    
   case 5: 
    portInfo(); 
    break; 
 
   case 6: 
    cout << endl << "[enter port number to search for] : "; 
    cin >> strInfo; 
    cin.ignore(80, '\n'); 
    cout << endl; 
 
    portVulnerabilities(strInfo, "REPORT"); 
    break; 
 
   case 7: 
    cout << endl << "[enter description string] : "; 
    cin >> strInfo; 
    cout << endl; 
 
    findDescription(strInfo); 
    cin.ignore(80, '\n'); 
    break; 
 
   case 8: 
    cout << endl << "[enter description string 1] : "; 
    cin >> strInfo; 
    cout << endl; 
 
 
    cout << endl << "[enter description string 2] : "; 
    cin >> strInfo2; 
    cout << endl; 
 
    findDescription2(strInfo, strInfo2); 
    cin.ignore(80, '\n'); 
    break; 
     
   case 9: 
    cout << endl << "[enter port number to search for] : "; 
    cin >> strInfo; 
    cin.ignore(80, '\n'); 
    cout << endl; 
 
    portVulnerabilities(strInfo, "INFO"); 
    break; 
 
 
   case 10: 
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     cout << endl << "[enter port number to search for] : "; 
    cin >> strInfo; 
    cin.ignore(80, '\n'); 
    cout << endl; 
 
    portVulnerabilities(strInfo, "NOTE"); 
    break; 
 
   case 11: 
    cout << endl << "[enter plugin number to search for] : "; 
    cin >> strInfo; 
    cin.ignore(80, '\n'); 
    cout << endl; 
 
    for (iPLG = vecPLUGDESC.begin(); iPLG != vecPLUGDESC.end(); iPLG++) 
    { 
 
     if ((*iPLG).strPlugin == strInfo) 
     { 
      cout << endl << (*iPLG).strDescription << endl; 
      cout << endl << "[find this information/vulnerability (y/n)] : "; 
      cin >> YN; 
      cout << endl; 
      cin.ignore(80, '\n'); 
       
      if (YN == 'y') 
      { 
       findPlugin(strInfo, "INFO"); 
       break; 
      } 
      else 
      { 
       cout << endl <<"!! error - user intervention" << endl; 
       break; 
      } 
 
     } 
 
     if (YN == 'y') 
      break; 
 
    } 
 
    if (YN == 'y') 
     break; 
 
    cout << "!! error - plugin not found" << endl << endl; 
    break; 
 
 
   case 12: 
    cout << endl << "[enter plugin number to search for] : "; 
    cin >> strInfo; 
    cin.ignore(80, '\n'); 
    cout << endl; 
 
    for (iPLG = vecPLUGDESC.begin(); iPLG != vecPLUGDESC.end(); iPLG++) 
    { 
 
     if ((*iPLG).strPlugin == strInfo) 
     { 
      cout << endl << (*iPLG).strDescription << endl; 
      cout << endl << "[find this information/vulnerability (y/n)] : "; 
      cin >> YN; 
      cout << endl; 
      cin.ignore(80, '\n'); 
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      if (YN == 'y') 
      { 
       findPlugin(strInfo, "NOTE"); 
       break; 
      } 
      else 
      { 
       cout << endl <<"!! error - user intervention" << endl; 
       break; 
      } 
 
     } 
 
     if (YN == 'y') 
      break; 
 
    } 
 
    if (YN == 'y') 
     break; 
 
    cout << "!! error - plugin not found" << endl << endl; 
    break; 
 
 
   case 97: 
    outputPlugin(); 
    break; 
 
   case 98: 
    cout << endl; 
    fstrIn.clear(); 
    vecMainData.clear(); 
    retrieveData(); 
    break; 
 
   case 99: 
    break; 
    
   default: 
    break; 
 
  } // switch 
 
  bGoodValue = false; 
  
 } while (nSelection != 99); 
 
} // mainMenu() 
 
// -- uniqueHosts() -- 
// 
// ------------------- 
 
void uniqueHosts() 
{ 
 
 bool    bFoundValue = false;  // value found flag 
 HOST*    HTemp;   // temporary host 
 string    strTemp;   // temporary string container 
 
 pvecHosts = new vector<HOST>; 
 
 vector<SELECTION>::iterator iSEL; 
 vector<HOST>::reverse_iterator iHOST; 
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// crawl main data vector for hostnames 
 for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++) 
 { 
  strTemp = (*iSEL).strHost; 
   
// check host vector for hostname found in vecMainData 
// reverse iterator chosen for "rule of proximity" 
  for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin(); 
   iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend() && bFoundValue == false; 
   iHOST++) 
  { 
 
   if (strTemp == (*iHOST).strHost) 
   { 
    bFoundValue = true; 
   } 
 
  } 
 
// if value is not found in host vector, add hostname to host vector 
  if (bFoundValue == false) 
  { 
 
   HTemp = new HOST; 
   (*HTemp).strHost = (*iSEL).strHost; 
   (*pvecHosts).push_back(*HTemp); 
   delete HTemp; 
 
  } 
 
// reset bFoundValue 
  bFoundValue = false; 
 
 } 
 
// output 
 cout << endl << "<list>" << endl; 
 
 for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin(); iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend(); iHOST++) 
 { 
  cout << (*iHOST).strHost; 
  cout << ": ("; 
  cout << returnOS((*iHOST).strHost); 
  cout << ")" << endl; 
 
 } 
 
 cout << "</list>" << endl; 
 
 cout << endl << "[done @ " << (*pvecHosts).size() << " hosts]" << endl << endl; 
 
 delete pvecHosts; 
 
} // uniqueHosts 
 
// --- openPorts() --- 
// 
// ------------------- 
 
void openPorts(string strPortNumber) 
{ 
 
 bool    bFoundValue = false;  // value found flag 
 HOST*    HTemp;   // temporary host 
 int    nCol1, nCol2;  // delimiter columns 
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  string    strTemp;   // temporary string container 
 
 pvecHosts = new vector<HOST>; 
 
 vector<SELECTION>::iterator iSEL; 
 vector<HOST>::reverse_iterator iHOST; 
 
// crawl main data vector for hostnames 
 for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++) 
 { 
   
// get port number 
  strTemp = (*iSEL).strPort; 
  nCol1 = strTemp.find_first_of("("); 
  nCol2 = strTemp.find_first_of("/"); 
  strTemp = strTemp.substr(nCol1 + 1, nCol2 - nCol1 - 1); 
 
// compare port numbers 
  if (strTemp == strPortNumber) 
  { 
    
// check host vector for hostname found in vecMainData 
// reverse iterator chosen for "rule of proximity" 
   for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin(); 
    iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend() && bFoundValue == false; 
    iHOST++) 
   { 
 
    if ((*iSEL).strHost == (*iHOST).strHost) 
    { 
     bFoundValue = true; 
    } 
 
   } 
 
// if value is not found in host vector, add hostname to host vector 
   if (bFoundValue == false) 
   { 
 
    HTemp = new HOST; 
    (*HTemp).strHost = (*iSEL).strHost; 
    (*pvecHosts).push_back(*HTemp); 
    delete HTemp; 
 
   } 
 
// reset bFoundValue 
   bFoundValue = false; 
 
  } 
 
 } 
 
// output 
 cout << endl << "<list>" << endl; 
 
 for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin(); iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend(); iHOST++) 
 { 
  cout << (*iHOST).strHost; 
  cout << ": ("; 
  cout << returnOS((*iHOST).strHost); 
  cout << ")" << endl; 
 } 
 
 cout << "</list>" << endl; 
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  cout << endl << "[done @ " << (*pvecHosts).size() << " systems with port " 
   << strPortNumber << " open]" << endl << endl; 
 
 delete pvecHosts; 
 
} // openPorts() 
 
// --- findPlugin() --- 
// 
// -------------------- 
 
void findPlugin(string strPluginNumber, string strType) 
{ 
 
 bool    bFoundValue = false;     // value found flag 
 HOST*    HTemp;   // temporary host 
 string    strTemp;   // temporary string container 
 
 pvecHosts = new vector<HOST>; 
 
 vector<SELECTION>::iterator iSEL; 
 vector<HOST>::reverse_iterator iHOST; 
 
// crawl main data vector for hostnames 
 for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++) 
 { 
   
// get port number 
  strTemp = (*iSEL).strPlugin; 
 
// compare port numbers 
  if ((strTemp == strPluginNumber) && ((*iSEL).strSeverity == strType)) 
  { 
    
// check host vector for hostname found in vecMainData 
// reverse iterator chosen for "rule of proximity" 
   for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin(); 
    iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend() && bFoundValue == false; 
    iHOST++) 
   { 
 
    if ((*iSEL).strHost == (*iHOST).strHost) 
    { 
     bFoundValue = true; 
    } 
 
   } 
 
// if value is not found in host vector, add hostname to host vector 
   if (bFoundValue == false) 
   { 
 
    HTemp = new HOST; 
    (*HTemp).strHost = (*iSEL).strHost; 
    (*pvecHosts).push_back(*HTemp); 
    delete HTemp; 
 
   } 
 
// reset bFoundValue 
   bFoundValue = false; 
 
  } 
 
 } 
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 // output 
 cout << endl << "<list>" << endl; 
 
 for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin(); iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend(); iHOST++) 
 { 
  cout << (*iHOST).strHost; 
  cout << ": ("; 
  cout << returnOS((*iHOST).strHost); 
  cout << ")" << endl; 
 
 } 
 
 cout << "</list>" << endl; 
 
 cout << endl << "[done @ " << (*pvecHosts).size() << " systems with specified " 
   << "information plugin " << strPluginNumber << "]" << endl << endl; 
 
 delete pvecHosts; 
 
} // findPlugin 
 
// --- findHoles() --- 
// 
// ------------------- 
 
void findHoles(string strPortNumber) 
{ 
 bool    bFoundValue = false; // value found flag 
 HOST*    HTemp;   // temporary host 
 int    nCol1, nCol2;  // delimiter columns 
 string    strTemp;   // temporary string container 
 
 pvecHosts = new vector<HOST>; 
 
 vector<SELECTION>::iterator iSEL; 
 vector<HOST>::reverse_iterator iHOST; 
 
// crawl main data vector for hostnames 
 for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++) 
 { 
   
// get port number 
  strTemp = (*iSEL).strPort; 
  nCol1 = strTemp.find_first_of("("); 
  nCol2 = strTemp.find_first_of("/"); 
  strTemp = strTemp.substr(nCol1 + 1, nCol2 - nCol1 - 1); 
 
// compare port numbers 
  if (strTemp == strPortNumber) 
  { 
    
   if ((*iSEL).strSeverity == "REPORT") 
   { 
 
// check host vector for hostname found in vecMainData 
// reverse iterator chosen for "rule of proximity" 
    for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin(); 
        iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend() && bFoundValue == false; 
     iHOST++) 
    { 
 
     if ((*iSEL).strHost == (*iHOST).strHost) 
     { 
      bFoundValue = true; 
     } 
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     } 
 
// if value is not found in host vector, add hostname to host vector 
    if (bFoundValue == false) 
    { 
 
     HTemp = new HOST; 
     (*HTemp).strHost = (*iSEL).strHost; 
     (*pvecHosts).push_back(*HTemp); 
     delete HTemp; 
 
    } 
 
// reset bFoundValue 
    bFoundValue = false; 
 
   } 
 
  } 
 
 } 
 
// output 
 cout << endl << "<list>" << endl; 
 
 for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin(); iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend(); iHOST++) 
 { 
  cout << (*iHOST).strHost; 
  cout << ": ("; 
  cout << returnOS((*iHOST).strHost); 
  cout << ")" << endl; 
 } 
 
 cout << "</list>" << endl; 
 
 cout << endl << "[done @ " << (*pvecHosts).size() << " systems with vulnerabilities " 
   << "on port " << strPortNumber << "]" << endl << endl; 
 
 delete pvecHosts; 
 
} // findHoles 
 
 
 
// --- portInfo() --- 
// 
// ------------------ 
 
void portInfo() 
{ 
 
 bool    bFoundValue = false; // value found flag 
 PORTSEV*   PTemp;   // temporary host 
 int    nCol1, nCol2;  // delimiter columns 
 int    INF = 0, 
     NOT = 0, 
     REP = 0;   // counters 
 string    strTemp;   // temporary string container 
 
 pvecSEV = new vector<PORTSEV>; 
 
 vector<SELECTION>::iterator iSEL; 
 vector<PORTSEV>::reverse_iterator iSEV; 
 
// crawl main data vector for hostnames 
 for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++) 
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  { 
   
// get port number 
  strTemp = (*iSEL).strPort; 
  nCol1 = strTemp.find_first_of("("); 
  nCol2 = strTemp.find_first_of("/"); 
  strTemp = strTemp.substr(nCol1 + 1, nCol2 - nCol1 - 1); 
 
// check severity vector for port found in vecMainData 
// reverse iterator chosen for "rule of proximity" 
  for(iSEV = (*pvecSEV).rbegin(); 
   iSEV != (*pvecSEV).rend() && bFoundValue == false; 
   iSEV++) 
  { 
 
   if ((*iSEL).strPort == (*iSEV).strPort) 
   { 
     
    if ((*iSEL).strSeverity == "NOTE") 
     (*iSEV).nNOTE++; 
    if ((*iSEL).strSeverity == "INFO") 
     (*iSEV).nINFO++; 
    if ((*iSEL).strSeverity == "REPORT") 
     (*iSEV).nREPORT++; 
 
    bFoundValue = true; 
 
   } 
 
  } 
 
// if value is not found in severity vector, add port number to severity vector 
  if (bFoundValue == false) 
  { 
 
   PTemp = new PORTSEV; 
   (*PTemp).strPort = (*iSEL).strPort; 
   (*PTemp).nINFO = 0; 
   (*PTemp).nNOTE = 0; 
   (*PTemp).nREPORT = 0; 
 
   if ((*iSEL).strSeverity == "NOTE") 
    (*PTemp).nNOTE++; 
   if ((*iSEL).strSeverity == "INFO") 
    (*PTemp).nINFO++; 
   if ((*iSEL).strSeverity == "REPORT") 
    (*PTemp).nREPORT++; 
 
   (*pvecSEV).push_back(*PTemp); 
   delete PTemp; 
 
  } 
// reset bFoundValue 
  bFoundValue = false; 
 
 } 
 
// output 
 char    c; 
 char    lclFileName[100];  // file name to output to 
 
 do 
 { 
  cout << endl << "[print to *S*creen or *F*ile] : "; 
  cin >> c; 
  cin.ignore(80, '\n'); 
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   cout << endl; 
 } while (c != 'S' && c != 's' && c != 'F' && c != 'f'); 
 
 sort ((*pvecSEV).rbegin(), (*pvecSEV).rend(), vecsort); 
 
 if (c == 'S' || c == 's') 
 { 
 
  cout << endl << "<list>" << endl; 
 
  for(iSEV = (*pvecSEV).rbegin(); iSEV != (*pvecSEV).rend(); iSEV++) 
  { 
   cout << (*iSEV).strPort << " Vulnerabilities: " << (*iSEV).nREPORT 
    << " | Warnings: " << (*iSEV).nINFO << " | Notes: " 
    << (*iSEV).nNOTE << endl; 
   NOT = NOT + (*iSEV).nNOTE; 
   INF = INF + (*iSEV).nINFO; 
   REP = REP + (*iSEV).nREPORT; 
 
  }; 
 
  cout << "</list>" << endl; 
 
  cout << endl << "[done @ " << (*pvecSEV).size() << " unique ports open]" << endl 
    << "[ " << REP << " vulnerabilities, " << INF << " warnings, " 
    << NOT << " notes ]" << endl; 
 
 } 
 else 
 { 
 
  cout << "[enter filename for report] : "; 
  cin >> lclFileName; 
  cin.ignore(80, '\n'); 
  cout << endl; 
 
  fstrOut.open(lclFileName, ios::out); 
 
  fstrOut << "<list>\n"; 
 
  for(iSEV = (*pvecSEV).rbegin(); iSEV != (*pvecSEV).rend(); iSEV++) 
  { 
   fstrOut << (*iSEV).strPort << " Vulnerabilities: " << (*iSEV).nREPORT 
      << " | Warnings: " << (*iSEV).nINFO << " | Notes: " 
      << (*iSEV).nNOTE << "\n"; 
   NOT = NOT + (*iSEV).nNOTE; 
   INF = INF + (*iSEV).nINFO; 
   REP = REP + (*iSEV).nREPORT; 
 
  }; 
 
  fstrOut << "</list>\n\n"; 
 
  fstrOut << "[done @ " << (*pvecSEV).size() << " unique ports open]\n" 
     << "[ " << REP << " vulnerabilities, " << INF << " warnings, " 
     << NOT << " notes ]\n"; 
 
  fstrOut.close(); 
 
 } 
 
 delete pvecSEV; 
 
} // portInfo 
 
bool vecsort(PORTSEV p1, PORTSEV p2) 
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 { 
 
 if (p1.nREPORT != p2.nREPORT) 
  return p1.nREPORT > p2.nREPORT; 
 else if (p1.nINFO != p2.nREPORT) 
  return p1.nINFO > p2.nINFO; 
 else 
  return p1.nNOTE > p2.nNOTE; 
 
} 
 
// --- outputPlugin() --- 
// 
// ---------------------- 
 
void outputPlugin() 
{ 
 
 char    lclFileName[100];  // file name to output to 
 vector<PLUGDESC>::iterator iPLG;    // iterator for PLUGDESC vector 
  
 cout << endl << "[enter filename for report] : "; 
 cin >> lclFileName; 
 cin.ignore(80, '\n'); 
 cout << endl; 
 
 fstrOut.open(lclFileName, ios::out); 
 
 for (iPLG = vecPLUGDESC.begin(); iPLG != vecPLUGDESC.end(); iPLG++) 
 { 
 
  fstrOut << "\n>>>>>[" << (*iPLG).strPlugin << "]" << endl; 
  fstrOut << (*iPLG).strDescription << "]" << endl; 
 
 } 
 
 fstrOut.close(); 
  
} // outputPlugin() 
 
// --- portVulnerabilities --- 
// 
// --------------------------- 
 
void portVulnerabilities(string strPortNumber, string strType) 
{ 
 
 bool    bFoundValue = false; // value found flag 
 PLUGDESC*   PTemp;   // temporary host 
 int    nCol1, nCol2;  // delimiter columns 
 string    strTemp, strTemp2;  // temporary string container 
 
 pvecPLG = new vector<PLUGDESC>; 
 
 vector<SELECTION>::iterator iSEL; 
 vector<PLUGDESC>::reverse_iterator iPLG; 
 
// crawl main data vector for hostnames 
 for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++) 
 { 
   
// get port number 
  strTemp = (*iSEL).strPort; 
  nCol1 = strTemp.find_first_of("("); 
  nCol2 = strTemp.find_first_of("/"); 
  strTemp = strTemp.substr(nCol1 + 1, nCol2 - nCol1 - 1); 
100 
  
  strTemp2 = (*iSEL).strSeverity; 
 
// compare port numbers 
  if (strTemp == strPortNumber && strTemp2 == strType) 
  { 
    
// find plugin in plugin vector 
   for(iPLG = (*pvecPLG).rbegin(); 
    iPLG != (*pvecPLG).rend() && bFoundValue == false; 
    iPLG++) 
   { 
 
    if ((*iSEL).strPlugin == (*iPLG).strPlugin) 
    { 
     bFoundValue = true; 
    } 
 
   } 
 
// if value is not found in host vector, add hostname to host vector 
   if (bFoundValue == false) 
   { 
 
    PTemp = new PLUGDESC; 
    (*PTemp).strPlugin = (*iSEL).strPlugin; 
    (*PTemp).strDescription = (*iSEL).strDescription; 
    (*pvecPLG).push_back(*PTemp); 
    delete PTemp; 
 
   } 
// reset bFoundValue 
   bFoundValue = false; 
 
  } 
 
 } 
 
// output 
 cout << endl << "<list>" << endl; 
 
 for(iPLG = (*pvecPLG).rbegin(); iPLG != (*pvecPLG).rend(); iPLG++) 
 { 
  cout << (*iPLG).strPlugin << endl; 
 } 
 
 cout << "</list>" << endl; 
 
 cout << endl << "[done @ " << (*pvecPLG).size() << " vulnerabilities on port " 
   << strPortNumber << "]" << endl << endl; 
 
 delete pvecPLG; 
 
} // portVulnerabilities 
 
// --- returnOS --- 
// 
// ---------------- 
 
string returnOS(string strHost) 
{ 
 
 bool   bFoundValue = false; 
 vector<OPERSYS>::iterator iOS; 
 
 for (iOS = vecOS.begin(); iOS != vecOS.end() && bFoundValue == false; iOS++) 
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  { 
  if ((*iOS).strHost == strHost) 
   return (*iOS).strOS; 
 } 
 
 return ("<no information>"); 
 
} 
 
// 
 
void findDescription(string strDescription) 
{ 
 
 bool    bFoundValue = false;  // value found flag 
 HOST*    HTemp;   // temporary host 
 string    strTemp;   // temporary string container 
 
 pvecHosts = new vector<HOST>; 
 
 vector<SELECTION>::iterator iSEL; 
 vector<HOST>::reverse_iterator iHOST; 
 
// crawl main data vector for hostnames 
 for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++) 
 { 
   
// get port number 
  strTemp = (*iSEL).strDescription; 
 
// compare port numbers 
  if (strTemp.find(strDescription) != string::npos) 
  { 
    
// check host vector for hostname found in vecMainData 
// reverse iterator chosen for "rule of proximity" 
   for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin(); 
    iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend() && bFoundValue == false; 
    iHOST++) 
   { 
 
    if ((*iSEL).strHost == (*iHOST).strHost) 
    { 
     bFoundValue = true; 
    } 
 
   } 
 
// if value is not found in host vector, add hostname to host vector 
   if (bFoundValue == false) 
   { 
 
    HTemp = new HOST; 
    (*HTemp).strHost = (*iSEL).strHost; 
    (*pvecHosts).push_back(*HTemp); 
    delete HTemp; 
 
   } 
 
// reset bFoundValue 
   bFoundValue = false; 
 
  } 
 
 } 
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 // output 
 cout << endl << "<list>" << endl; 
 
 for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin(); iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend(); iHOST++) 
 { 
  cout << (*iHOST).strHost; 
  cout << ": ("; 
  cout << returnOS((*iHOST).strHost); 
  cout << ")" << endl; 
 
 } 
 
 cout << "</list>" << endl; 
 
 cout << endl << "[done @ " << (*pvecHosts).size() << " systems with specified " 
   << "description: " << strDescription << "]" << endl << endl; 
 
 delete pvecHosts; 
}  
 
// 
 
void findDescription2(string strInfo, string strInfo2) 
{ 
 
 bool    bFoundValue = false;  // value found flag 
 HOST*    HTemp;   // temporary host 
 string    strTemp;        // temporary string container 
 
 pvecHosts = new vector<HOST>; 
 vector<HOST> vecBoth; 
 
 vector<SELECTION>::iterator iSEL; 
 vector<HOST>::reverse_iterator iHOST; 
 
// crawl main data vector for hostnames 
 for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++) 
 { 
   
// get port number 
  strTemp = (*iSEL).strDescription; 
 
// compare port numbers 
  if (strTemp.find(strInfo) != string::npos) 
  { 
    
// check host vector for hostname found in vecMainData 
// reverse iterator chosen for "rule of proximity" 
   for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin(); 
    iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend() && bFoundValue == false; 
    iHOST++) 
   { 
 
    if ((*iSEL).strHost == (*iHOST).strHost) 
    { 
     bFoundValue = true; 
    } 
 
   } 
 
// if value is not found in host vector, add hostname to host vector 
   if (bFoundValue == false) 
   { 
 
    HTemp = new HOST; 
    (*HTemp).strHost = (*iSEL).strHost; 
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     (*pvecHosts).push_back(*HTemp); 
    delete HTemp; 
 
   } 
 
// reset bFoundValue 
   bFoundValue = false; 
 
  } 
 
 } 
  
 for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++) 
 { 
   
// get port number 
  strTemp = (*iSEL).strDescription; 
 
// compare port numbers 
  if (strTemp.find(strInfo2) != string::npos) 
  { 
    
// check host vector for hostname found in vecMainData 
// reverse iterator chosen for "rule of proximity" 
   for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin(); 
    iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend() && bFoundValue == false; 
    iHOST++) 
   { 
 
    if ((*iSEL).strHost == (*iHOST).strHost) 
    { 
     bFoundValue = true; 
     HTemp = new HOST; 
     (*HTemp).strHost = (*iSEL).strHost; 
     (vecBoth).push_back(*HTemp); 
     delete HTemp; 
      
    } 
 
   } 
// reset bFoundValue 
   bFoundValue = false; 
 
  } 
 
 } 
 
// output 
 cout << endl << "<list>" << endl; 
 
 for(iHOST = (vecBoth).rbegin(); iHOST != (vecBoth).rend(); iHOST++) 
 { 
  cout << (*iHOST).strHost; 
  cout << ": ("; 
  cout << returnOS((*iHOST).strHost); 
  cout << ")" << endl; 
 
 } 
 
 cout << "</list>" << endl; 
 
 cout << endl << "[done @ " << (vecBoth).size() << " systems with specified " 
   << "description: " << strInfo << " & " << strInfo2 << "]" << endl << endl; 
 
 delete pvecHosts; 
} 
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